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This thesis explores the non-linear features of fiscal multipliers in the US economy and
of consumption drivers in the euro area. In Chapter 1 we examine a Smooth Transition
implementation of a VAR model by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). We show
how the difference in the fiscal multiplier disappears when the design matrix is not
augmented with business cycle lags and the model is estimated in first differences.
Furthermore, we build on this original approach by using generalized impulse analysis
to produce authentic non-linear impulse responses. Our results highlight the Great
Recession as a significant turning point, the inclusion of which in the sample enables us
to reverse the sign of the effect on GDP of a fiscal shock and endorse the expansionary
budget cuts narrative.
Chapter 2 presents the use of the same STVAR and generalized impulse response
analysis to examine the non-linear effects of unanticipated government expenditure
shocks on US GDP, controlling for private credit and public debt. We also perform a
scenario analysis exercise to investigate shock responses during recessions and expan-
sions, while making explicit the effect of the shock on public debt. We find that (i)
the results support the inclusion of a measure of fiscal burden in the model; (ii) the
GDP response to fiscal shocks is asymmetric in sign and magnitude; (iii) there exists
a phenomenon of diminishing returns to expansionary shocks, which limits counter-
cyclical fiscal policy; (iv) scenario analysis shows stronger multipliers on average in
typical recessions.
We investigate the combined effect of business and financial cycles on a non-linearly
fluctuating economy in Chapter 3, designing and estimating a joint economic cycle. A
STVAR model and generalized impulse response analysis enable us to examine the
non-linear effect on GDP of unanticipated government expenditure shocks, which we
complement by performing scenario analysis. The main findings are that (i) every
specification shows concordance between signs of shock and GDP response; (ii) the
inclusion of an indicator of fiscal capacity in the model leaves the baseline key findings
unchanged; (iii) the main results show diminishing returns to increasing expansionary
stimuli; (iv) public debt and private credit generally behave pro-cyclically; (v) scenario
analysis suggests higher yield to shocks during recessions.
Chapter 4 studies the cyclical dynamics of consumption in the euro area (EA) and
the large EA countries by distinguishing between durable and nondurable expenditures.
We adopt a theoretical partial equilibrium framework to justify the identification strat-
egy of our empirical model, a time-varying parameter structural vector autoregression
(TVP-SVAR). Following the main insight from the theoretical model – that liquid-
ity constraints induce important interactions between durables and nondurables – we
distinguish durable-specific demand and supply shocks, while taking into account mon-
etary and credit conditions. Our main findings are: (i) durables react faster and more
strongly than nondurables after monetary shocks in the euro area and in the largest
EA countries; (ii) there is large degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the factors that
drive consumption; (iii) strength of spillovers from durables to nondurables is empiri-
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Every social scientist approaching the practice of research is bound to quickly learn a
fundamental lesson: models, irrespective of how complex or well-designed they might
be, are but a vast simplification of the intricacies we experience on a daily basis in the
real world. This holds true even more so in the field of empirical economic research,
as we try to find quantitative answers to questions too complex to be treated in their
original form. One of the most apparent shortcomings of a large part of our models
is to assume that responses hold constant over time and are, more generally, linear.
As pointed out by Alan Greenspan in his opening remarks of the 2003 symposium
sponsored by the Kansas City Federal Reserve,
An assumption of linearity may be adequate for estimating average rela-
tionships, but few expect that an economy will respond linearly to every
aberration [. . . ] Recent history has also reinforced the perception that the
relationships underlying the economy’s structure change over time in ways
that are difficult to anticipate.1
The effort to consider non-linearities in the analysis of different phenomena will be the
fil rouge throughout this dissertation.
We focus on two different phenomena in which a non-linear perspective can produce
new results and greatly impact the narrative: Government expenditure fiscal multipliers
in the US economy, that is how much the GDP reacts to a fiscal government expenditure
shock, and cyclical dynamics of consumption in the euro area (EA), as well as in the EA
member states. Regarding fiscal multipliers, we model a state-contingent economy using
an a-theoretical model which lets the economy free to fluctuate on a continuum of states
between the extreme phases of the cycle. We build on previous studies and expand the
focus from the business cycle to an economy led by a financial cycle. Furthermore,
we build and estimate a comprehensive economic cycle, carrying information on both
real economy and financial variables, and we present a selection of meaningful results
yielded by its use in conditioning the model.
In chapter 4 we shift our focus to consumption dynamics in the EA and large EA
countries, distinguishing durable and nondurable expenditures. Modelling consumption
in a non-trivial and insightful way becomes substantially more challenging when the
task includes consumer durables like cars, furniture, and electronics, which provide
utility over multiple periods and depreciate over time. Furthermore, since they can be
financed with credit (as well as used as collateral), these durables are often sensible
to interest rate dynamics and can exhibit some important adjustment costs. These
features have led expenditures on consumer durables to account for a much more than
proportionate part of overall economic fluctuations.
Several studies have been produced on fiscal multipliers, a topic which cyclically
dominates even the public non-specialistic debate, given its policy relevance and cen-
trality. The question of how much and how well the economy will react to a given fiscal
shock via government expenditure is a central pillar of the discussion surrounding the
1Greenspan, A. (2003). Monetary policy under uncertainty. In Opening remarks – Economic Policy
Symposium: ”Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy” – Jackson Hole,
pages 1–7. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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cost and efficiency of any public intervention on the economy. This holds particularly
true during periods of crisis, when a counter-cyclical government intervention is often a
key part of the damage control and recovery strategy. Typical research questions in this
strand of literature include the exact size of the multiplier and the optimal structure
of intervention to apply in order to achieve the maximum effect. Typical answers are
that the multipliers are around one in size, slightly larger during recessions, depending
on which model and sample are used to compute them. We make an effort to go be-
yond such questions. In a non-linear setup the dynamic and the evolution path of the
response to a shock become much more relevant than its peak size, since the behaviour
of the economy is contingent on its own state and on the characteristics of the shock.
At the same time, we do not overlook how central it is, under a policy perspective, to
know whether a recession can be counteracted with a fiscal stimulus package. To this
end, the question is translated in non-linear terms and the model is calibrated so that
the economy is in a state of average representative recession (or expansion) when the
shock hits, but it is then left free to evolve naturally according to its own non-linear
mechanics.
There are few studies in the literature which feature a distinction between durable
and nondurable consumption. Data limitations have severely restricted any model-
based investigation of structural factors behind expenditures on consumer durable
goods in the euro area, as well as their interaction with the other components of con-
sumption. Since such studies are, to our knowledge, virtually non-existent at the time
of writing, one of our main contributions can be considered an in-depth investigation
into this crucial demand component.
To explore the interactions between US fiscal policies and the broad economy, im-
posing as few theoretical assumptions as possible and, at the same time, preserving a
certain degree of comparability with the literature, our model of choice is a Smooth
Transition VAR, as introduced by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). This model
allows the shocks to propagate via two channels: a dynamic one, through the lag polyno-
mials, and a contemporaneous one, via the state-contingent shock variance-covariance
matrix. Our estimation strategy exploits the fact that the model linearises for a given
guess of the variance-covariance matrix, whose non-standard distribution needs, how-
ever, to be numerically estimated. To this aim, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Bayesian technique, adopting the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm with flat
priors, a well established choice in the literature. To keep the non-linear transition
dynamics intact we use generalized impulse response functions (GIRF), which are de-
fined as the expectation of the realization conditional on the history and the shock,
over a baseline conditional expectation on just the history. As the differences between
two conditional expectations are random variables, the value of the impulse response is
itself a random variable. Since our model is known, we are able to use a Monte Carlo
approach to estimate the distribution of the conditional expectations and, therefore, to
obtain the empirical distribution of the realizations of the generalized impulse response.
This enables us to conveniently estimate any preferred measure of centrality of distribu-
tion, as well as the confidence bands. We adopt short-run recursive restrictions implied
by Cholesky decomposition to identify fiscal shocks from the vector of reduced form
residuals. Scenario analysis experiments rely on the flexibility provided by the GIRF
approach to keep the exercise simple, while still meaningful. After picking a criterion to
build a chronology of recessions and expansions, we select the quarters falling in a given
regime, as well as their lags, to put together a history of regime-specific realizations.
The median of such series gives a typical, representative scenario history, which we use
to augment our sample effectively feeding the lag mechanics of the model with synthetic
values reflecting a given state of the economy. This allows us to explicitly define the
history on which the expectation is conditional. A further extension of this exercise,
limited to the specifications including public debt, is to explicitly assume what impact
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the government expenditure variation will have on public debt. That is, to simulate
either debt-financed fiscal expansions, or budget cuts aimed at restructuring the stock
of public debt.
Chapter 3 is centred around the concept of a synthetic measure for both the real
activity and the financial environment. We name this index the economic cycle, as
it includes informative power on the economy as a whole. In order to build such a
cycle, we start from a large monthly database of economic and financial variables: the
Fred-MD database put together by McCracken and Ng (2016) as an extension of Stock
and Watson (1996). We straightforwardly follow a factor analysis reasoning and go
for a dimension-reduction strategy: we use an information criterion to identify the
optimal number of factors and adopt the well known EM algorithm to estimate them.
Factors are interpreted as informative about real production and activity, employment,
interest rates, forward looking, prices, or the stock market according to which series
they are able to explain the most. Consequently, we filter them with a passband filter
to extract either the short-term business cycle-related components of the larger and
broader financial cycle frequencies. Finally, we project GDP onto the filtered factors to
estimate an index rich in information and animated by fundamental drivers spanning
the whole economy – financial side included.
When approaching the structural factors of consumption in the EA, we start by
setting up a simple theoretical model distinguishing between durable and nondurable
consumption, in which we embed non-linear dynamics and occasionally binding bor-
rowing constraints. The model does not aim to represent the whole economy, but
rather it focuses on a very specific class of agents – the quasi-constrained ones – as they
are unable to fully adjust to their preferences due to a non-linear liquidity constraint
kicking in. A key model-based prediction is that such agents will experience a shift in
consumption after a durable-specific shock, from durable to nondurable expenditures,
which we dub a spillover. We take this result as a confirmation that durable and non-
durable consumption need to be modelled separately and in a time-contingent manner,
to allow for asynchronous and non-linear adjustments in the presence of borrowing
constraints. Following this intuition, we step into the empirical investigation, using
a time-varying parameter structural vector autoregressive model (TVP-SVAR) which
explicitly allows for non-linearities both via its coefficient matrix and via its stochastic
volatility features. We use country-level data on 19 EA member states to build the
series for the euro area as a whole, and estimate the model over a sample from 1997Q1
to 2018Q3. We compare results for the EA, the four largest EA countries – Germany,
France, Italy, and Spain – as well as the US. Our identification strategy relies on a mix of
short-term zero and sign restrictions and it is able to account for broad monetary and
credit conditions (considering together continent-wide monetary policy and country-
level idiosyncratic credit environment), while distinguishing between durable-specific
and aggregate consumption supply and demand shocks.
Overall, we find merit in an econometric framework allowing for non-linear features,
as it better fits complex real-world phenomena. Concerning fiscal multipliers and the
econometric strategy used to investigate them, in Chapter 1 we show that including
the whole Great Recession in the sample dramatically changes the dynamics of the
response to a shock, as well as some of its key features, notably including the sign of
the response. This raises crucial caveats over the stability of non-linear findings and
advocates for caution when evaluating policy measures enacted in a peri-crisis period,
where two different dynamics merge. Conclusions of Chapter 2 are that (i) the results
support the inclusion of a measure of fiscal burden in the model; (ii) once allowing for
non-linear features in the model, the GDP response to fiscal shocks is asymmetric in
sign and magnitude; (iii) there exists a phenomenon of diminishing returns to increasing
expansionary shocks, which calls into question the efficiency of counter-cyclical fiscal
policies during a crisis; (iv) scenario analysis shows on average stronger multipliers
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in typical recessions. We confirm these findings in Chapter 3, showing that (i) every
specification shows a concordance between the sign of the shock and GDP response;
(ii) the inclusion of fiscal burden and fiscal space in the model does not alter the key
findings of the baseline, proving that the economic cycle is informative enough; (iii)
main results show diminishing returns to larger expansionary stimuli; (iv) public debt
and private credit generally behaves pro-cyclically; (v) scenario analysis suggests that
on average fiscal multipliers are stronger in a typical recession.
Our main results on consumption dynamics in the euro area can be summarised as
follows: (i) durables react faster and stronger than nondurables after monetary shocks
in the euro area and in the largest euro area countries, confirming an outcome commonly
reported for the United States; (ii) there is a large degree of cross-country heterogeneity
in how different factors (including durable-specific ones) explain consumption; (iii)
the strength of spillovers from durable to nondurable consumption, as predicted by
theory, is empirically correlated with the extent to which households across countries
are likely to be liquidity constrained. In particular, countries with a larger share of
constrained households, like Italy and Spain, experience larger spillovers from durable-
specific factors on nondurable consumption.
This thesis develops as follows. Chapter 1 revisits a measure of output response
to fiscal policy, it explores some technical features of the STVAR model, it shows how
modelling choices can steer the results, and it substantiates the claim that a GIRF
approach yields richer findings than a linear one. In Chapter 2 we assume that the
economy is fluctuating along a purely financial cycle and we show how the GDP reacts
to government expenditure shocks. Chapter 3 delves into an economy contingent on a
novel economic cycle, encompassing real economy and financial environment informa-
tion. We show how this new measure of economic and financial activity can produce
richer results with more parsimonious specifications. The dynamics and structural
drivers of consumption are explored in Chapter 4.
Chapter 1
Revisiting the measure of output
response to fiscal policy
1.1 Introduction
Be it either in the midst of a recession or in times of prosperity, when policy makers
are faced with the choice to use fiscal policy to influence the economy, the underlying
question is often simply How large is the multiplier? That is, how much the fiscal
intervention will affect the broad economy, measured by the means of GDP. Such an
answer is made less straightforward by the state of the economy itself: the way the
economy – a complex system made of a plethora of parts interacting with each other
in what is often a non-linear fashion – will react to a shock will depend on its status.
In other words, the same fiscal shock will bring forth different outcomes depending on
when and how it is delivered.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, henceforth AG) find large differences in the
size of fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions, with the spending multiplier being
considerably larger in recessions. Their research can be taken as a seminal contribution
in the field of empirical investigation on state-contingent multipliers, and it has inspired
a number of other works exploring non-linearities and state contingency. Callegari et al.
(2012) use a somewhat simpler non-linear econometric framework, a threshold VAR, to
estimate the effect of several budget consolidation programs following the 2009 finan-
cial crisis (the so called austerity period). Their results endorse fiscal consolidations
operated via spending cuts rather than tax increases and estimate that a spending
cut initiated during a period of economic expansion will be contractionary only in the
short-term, as opposed to the longer lasting effect of a spending cut initiated during a
recession.
Galvão and Owyang (2018) augment the AG smooth transition model with finan-
cial factors, acknowledging the crucial role of the financial environment, in the same
spirit as our Chapter 2, albeit with an approach closer to the setup in Chapter 3. They
find evidence of the existence of important non-linear dynamics occurring between the
financial conditions and macroeconomic variables measuring production and price sta-
bility, thus advocating for the adoption of models able to allow for such non-linearities.
Bolboaca and Fischer (2019) look into the non-linear effect that news shock about
technological innovation brings forth adopting the same econometric framework as AG.
They find important differences in the effect of a news shock hitting the economy in
different times. A shock can initiate a boom and make the economy transition from
a recession to an expansionary phase, but the reaction will be slower that in normal
times, albeit larger. They identify a state variable in the amount of uncertainty, which
is negatively correlated with the business cycle and can impair the positive effect of
a shock. Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) investigate the business cycle conditionality
of monetary policy shocks in the US economy. Using a different modelling strategy
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centred on a smooth transition local projection framework, they find similar results:
non-linearities do exist and the timing of a shock in terms of business cycle phase is
crucial to determine its overall effect. Berger and Vavra (2014) look at consumption of
durable goods under different government purchase behaviours. They adopt the very
same AG econometric specification and famously find that the expenditure on durables
reacts strongly procyclically to government expenditure shocks.
AG use a non-linear Smooth Transition VAR model, a multivariate extension by
van Dijk et al. (2002) of the univariate specification already proposed by Granger and
Teräsvirta (1993), further extended by allowing the variance-covariance matrix of the
innovation shock to be subject to the smooth transition mechanism. The model is
estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods with the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm and flat priors. The choice of variables follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002,
henceforth BP): (log real) government expenditure (G), net tax receipts (T ), and gross
domestic product (Y ), for a sample from 1947Q1 to 2008Q4. Multipliers are computed
using orthogonalised impulse response functions analysis, adopting the same BP order:
[G, T, Y ].
We clarify how much the original results are affected by the augmentation of the
model with foreign variables, and by the choice of estimating the model in levels, thus
mapping statistical interactions among levels into a cycle. The first issue originates from
the model estimation strategy using, at its core, Generalised Least Squares to perform
the model parameter estimation, where the design matrix is augmented with lags of the
state indicator treated as a foreign variable. Such an approach could inflate the effect
of a policy shock and potentially lead to the estimation of large differences in the size
of fiscal multipliers between regimes. The second issue spurs from the estimation of the
model using non-stationary data in levels. Despite the advantage of a super-consistent
estimation of parameters using cointegrated series, this approach still raises a number
of questions. Particularly, the Bayesian sampling procedure relies on hypothesis testing
to ensure convergence and consequently any form of inference when GLS estimation is
applied to cointegrated series becomes fragile.
Building on the original approach of AG we introduce generalized impulse response
analysis, as in Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), to overcome the most
crucial limitation of the linear orthogonalized IRFs used in the original paper, which
is the implicit assumption that the regimen is extreme and does not change over time.
However, we improve the methodology to allow for the identification of fiscal shocks,
following the spirit of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Pellegrino (2021). The identifica-
tion is achieved by imposing the conventional short-run recursive structural restrictions
implied by Cholesky decomposition on the vector of reduced form residuals. We also
complement the original narrative with an updated sample.
The chapter proceeds on as follows. Section 1.2 deals with the inclusion of exogenous
variables, and Section 1.3 with the estimation in levels. Section 1.4 show results of
generalized impulse response analysis. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Smooth Transition VAR or VARx?
The Smooth Transition VAR model used by AG is given by
Xt = [(1− F (zt−1))ΠE + F (zt−1)ΠR] (L)Xt−1 + ut
ut ∼ N(0,Ωt)





Var(z) = 1 E[z] = 0,
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where X is the data matrix, ΠE and ΠC are the coefficient matrices; z is the switching
variable, ruling the transition on the cycle, and computed as the 7-quarters moving
average of the GDP growth; and 0 ≤ F ≤ 1 is the smoothing function. The subscripts
E and R refer respectively to expansion and recession phases of the business cycle.
The estimation strategy, summarized in Appendix A.1, rests on the maximum likeli-
hood approach developed in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). The model log likelihood
is given by













ut = Xt − (1− F (zt−1))ΠE(L)Xt−1 − F (zt−1)ΠR(L)Xt−1
and a is a constant. After defining
Wt = [(1− F (zt−1))Xt−1, F (zt−1)Xt−1 . . . (1− F (zt−1))Xt−p, F (zt−1)Xt−p]
ut = Xt −ΠW′t
(1.2)





















For any guess of the model variance-covariance matrix Ωt, Equation (1.3) gives
the optimal value of Π = [ΠE ,ΠR]. Crucially, when defining W in Equation (1.2)
AG augment it with lags of the indicator variable z. This amounts to transforming
the model into a STVARx, where the foreign variables added are lags of the output
growth smoothed by a seventh order moving average – that is, a function of one of
the endogenous variables themselves. This results in the estimation of an augmented
Π = [ΠE ,ΠR,Πz] matrix, from which only the two submatrices ΠE and ΠR are then
extracted and used for computation of the multipliers.
Using the above specification with the original Wt as per Equation (1.2) critically
changes the size of the response to the policy experiment. This can be seen in Figure
1.1, showing linear orthogonalized impulse response functions with (a) or without (b)
an augmented design matrix W.
Figure 1.1: Effect of foreign variables













(a) With foreign variables













(b) Without foreign variables
Note: GDP response to a unit standard deviation of government expenditure for a model with (a)
and without (b) augmentation of the design matrix W. STVAR(x) includes (log real) government
expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
While the results still show a disparity in the effects of a policy shock during reces-
sions and expansions, this is smaller than the original results and shorter as well, since
any statistically significant difference wanes after ten quarters.
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1.3 Estimation in levels
Whether a VAR can be used with non-stationary data is a question sparking contro-
versy since Sims (1980) and his call to move away from artificial constraints used to
identify simultaneous equations models. A VAR-specific perspective of the problem
can be found in Sims et al. (1990), with the main point always being that differencing
variables to achieve stationarity inevitably comes at the cost of disregarding impor-
tant information on the long-run relationship among the levels. Moreover, estimating
a VAR in levels with cointegrated series brings a super-consistent estimation of the
parameters, which converge with rate T instead of
√
T .
Notwithstanding the validity of these points, there are some solid reasons com-
pelling us to use stationary data for this and for the following Chapters’ specifications.
First, the claim by Sims (1980) that Bayesian methods can provide consistency even
with non-stationary data does not find application in this specific case. Overall, our
procedure possesses Bayesian features, since it makes use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo
with the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm. Nevertheless, the proper estimation
step of the model is performed via GLS. Furthermore, the Bayesian part relies on hy-
pothesis testing of the parameters matrix to select feasible guesses and, ultimately,
to converge. Therefore, even a partial cointegration between series is able to invali-
date standard hypothesis testing (Toda and Phillips, 1993). Second, extreme caution is
needed specifically when GLS estimation is applied on I(1) series, as highlighted by Kil-
ian and Lütkepohl (2017). Lastly, the model does not include any control for the level
of the variables, thus ignoring any possible stock-effect, and mapping non-stationary
variables into a business cycle amounts to assuming that the same phase of the cycle
will feature the same properties regardless of the relative level of the variables, which
is bound to change over time due to different long-run growth rates.
We achieve stationarity by first differencing our variables and then estimating the
VAR. We use cumulated responses to retrieve the effect of the shock in levels, as shown
in Figure 1.2, which presents orthogonalized impulse response functions for data in
levels (a) and in first differences (b).
Figure 1.2: Linear orthogonalized impulse responses in levels and first differences













(a) Estimated in levels













(b) Estimated in first differences
Note: GDP response (b is cumulated) to a unit standard deviation of government expenditure. STVAR
includes (log real) government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP. Confidence bands are at 5th and
95th percentile.
Any difference in GDP response to a policy shock between recession and expansion
takes place in the first two quarters, after which it becomes virtually non-existent.
When the model is estimated in first differences, the effect can be said to be very
short-term, to become statistically insignificant after about the fifth quarter.
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1.4 Updating methodology and sample
The most striking limitation of the AG linear VAR orthogonalized IRF approach is
that the results are no longer state-contingent, as we select one specific value of the
smoothing function (and therefore a specific phase of the business cycle). AG present
results for the extremes of the cycle, choosing F = {1; 0}, thus assuming that the
economy will always be stuck in either a peak or a trough of the cycle.
We use the generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) approach developed by
Koop et al. (1996) to capture the smooth transitioning of the economy along the cycle.
This technique uses expectation operators conditioned either on the history (H) or on
the history and the shock (s), averaging out future shocks. The general impulse is
defined as the expectation of the realization of Xt conditional on the history and the
shock over a baseline consisting of the conditional expectation given only the history:
GIX(h, st,Ht−1) = E [Xt+h | Ht−1, st]− E [Xt+h | Ht−1] ,
for the horizon h = 0, 1, . . . .
(1.4)
GIX(h, st,Ht−1) represents a realization of the random variableGI, defined in Equa-
tion (1.4) as the difference of two conditional expectations being themselves random
variables. Since our model is known, we are able to use a Monte Carlo approach to
estimate the distribution of the conditional expectations and, therefore, to retrieve the
empirical distribution of the realizations of GI allowing for a measure of centrality and
for the estimation of the confidence bands. This approach traditionally does not re-
quire identification of structural shocks, as detailed in Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran
and Shin (1998), and maps the model dynamics to a government expenditure Equation
residual shock, making the order of the variables irrelevant. The question asked by the
classical GIRF approach is simply: what happens if we have a unitary shock in the
residuals of the government expenditure equation today (since we are conditioning the
impulse on the whole history)?
To correctly identify a fiscal shock, we need to adapt the procedure: in the spirit
of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Pellegrino (2021), we identify the fiscal shocks
from the vector of reduced form residuals adopting the conventional short-run recursive
restrictions implied by Cholesky decomposition. This comes with the price of losing
the ability of disregarding the order of variables in the STVAR. Moreover, we are also
extending the sample up to 2019Q4. This choice allows us to include in the estimation
sample the Great Recession, while we deliberately leave out the most recent 2020-2021
recession induced by the global pandemic. Our reasoning is that the former was a
recession born out of the financial environment and its origin was embedded in the
complex system which is an economy, while the second has been triggered by a purely
exogenous policy measure aiming to reduce social interactions.
We consider both positive and negative shocks, namely ±1% and ±5% of the U.S.
government expenditure, roughly corresponding to ±0.15% and ±0.8% of GDP. The
choice of a ±5% shock is in line with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009 (2009) stimulus package, which delivered a combined impact of
roughly 2.5% of GDP in the first year of enactment, as clearly shown in The Congress
of the United States - Congressional Budget Office (2012). The results, for both the
original (a) and the updated sample (b), are shown in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative GIRFs, original and longer sample
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(a) Original sample












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Updated longer sample
Note: Percentage GDP response to a fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure,
the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP.
The longer sample goes from 1947Q1 to 2019Q4, while the shorter one stops at 2008Q4. Confidence
bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
As expected, the results differ greatly: updating the sample not only means estimat-
ing the model on different data, but also triggering the shock in a different phase of the
cycle, endowed with a different dynamic (as in a different set of observations fed into
the autoregressive lag mechanism). Some general features are, however, maintained:
the shock responses are not symmetrical, neither sign- nor size-wise, thus exposing the
non-linear properties of the model. In both the samples larger shocks have a more
volatile effect than smaller ones and the model manages to identify them well, with the
exception of the large negative shock in the longer sample, which appears ill-identified
upwards.
The main difference between the two sets of results clearly resides in the sign of
the reaction. With an updated sample, we find that positive government expenditure
shocks are recessionary, while negative ones are indeed expansionary. Moreover, the
magnitudes displayed by the model estimated on the longer sample are on average larger
that the ones displayed by the shorter sample. It is easy to spot the crucial difference
between samples: the inclusion of the Great Recession. It appears reasonable to impute
to the 2009 crisis and subsequent recovery period the results displayed by Figure 1.3(b).
An interesting phenomenon, partially hindered in its interpretation by the large
uncertainty associated with the estimation of the effects of the larger negative shock, is
what appears to be a sort of diminishing return to increasingly large expansionary (in
the effect) shocks. Larger budget cuts are more expansionary than smaller ones, but
not proportionally more expansionary.
1.5 Conclusions
AG find large differences in the size of fiscal multipliers, with spending multipliers
being sensibly larger in recessions. We suggested that the size of such differences may
be inflated by the inclusion of past lags of the indicator variable, that is of past lags of
a function of one of the STVAR variables, in the design matrix of the GLS estimation
step. In a model without such an addition the difference between regimes as computed
by AG becomes considerably smaller.
We also considered whether the model should be estimated in first differences, given
the need for clear inference of the Bayesian sampling methodology and the caveats
associated with applying GLS estimation on potentially cointegrated series in levels.
The results deriving from this correction strongly challenge the original narrative, since
the difference between multipliers in the two extreme regimes becomes negligible.
Finally, we built on the original strategy implementing GIRF analysis and we up-
dated the sample to include the Great Recession. The results prove the value of using
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a non-linear model that allows the economy to fluctuate. Firstly, shock responses are
not symmetrical and depend on the size and the sign of the shock. Furthermore, the
dynamics shown by the different responses reinforce our choice to use a model able
to accommodate for complex dynamics. Secondly, the longer sample yields a negative
reaction to positive fiscal expenditure shock, while negative shocks bring a positive ef-
fect. This is an expected and even desired result: it proves that including a large scale
event such as the 2009-2011 recession can drastically change the dynamics picked up
by the model. While we believe it is desirable to have a model incorporating the most
recent dynamics displayed by the economy, this limits the generality of the results and
calls for great caution if using it to advance policy arguments (such as the existence
of expansionary budget cuts á la Alesina and Ardagna (2013)) relating to pre-crisis
shocks. Thirdly, there seems to be a diminishing return to the expansionary power of
larger budget cuts, where a heavier budget reduction does not yield a proportionally
larger GDP response, contrary to what we observed with budget increases.
Chapter 2
Non-linear effects of the financial
cycle on fiscal multipliers
2.1 Introduction
The debate about fiscal multipliers, their magnitude, their evolution over time, and
their sensitivity to different monetary policy stances or, as more recently explored, to
other institutional and macroeconomic environmental variables (unemployment level,
labour or goods market openness degree) is endowed with a long history, and yet is far
from being concluded. The topic has very recently found a renewed popularity due to
the 2020-2021 pandemic crisis, which required massive public relief efforts under the
guise of an increase in government expenditure.
The heterogeneity of the related results presented in the recent literature has been
extensively surveyed by Favero and Karamysheva (2017). The meta-study looks at
the plethora of available empirical estimated, partitioning them between strictly-VAR
and narrative approaches. The former group includes the seminal work of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), the sign-restricted version of Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and
the expectations-augmented approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Fisher and
Peters (2010). The narrative restrictions family includes the fundamental contribution
of Romer and Romer (2010) later extended by Pescatori et al. (2011), the focus on fiscal
policy mix of Leeper (2010), the attempt to retrieve better tax multipliers of Favero
and Giavazzi (2012), and the focus on tax mix of Mertens and Ravn (2014). Favero and
Karamysheva (2017) conclude that a golden fiscal multiplier estimate does not exist,
due to the sensitivity of the figures to model specification and identification restrictions,
and that much more attention should be paid to the dynamics. Such a remark seems
to find a natural answer in the line of inquiry assuming time-varying fiscal multipliers,
or rather multipliers contingent on some state variable -usually the business cycle.
This research contributes to the literature on state contingency of fiscal multipliers,
with a focus on whether the economy reacts differently in different phases of the financial
cycle through expansion or contraction. We consider an economy that fluctuates with
the financial cycle, specifically investigating the state contingency of the effects of a
fiscal stimulus. Our angle is unlike most studies that we show that fiscal multipliers
significantly change between regimes defined by the business cycle, while they appear
stable at the extreme stages of the financial cycle. However, they are significantly
affected by the cycle dynamic and by the inclusion in the model of a measure of fiscal
burden.
We focus on the financial cycle in an effort to take finance seriously, as notably
advocated by Jordà et al. (2017). Several phenomena compel us to consider financial
fluctuations: the surge of private credit in the second half of the twentieth century, the
astonishing growth of the financial sector, and the very recent evidence from the Great
Recession, where financial turmoil brought about sizeable output losses. Arcand et al.
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(2015) consider whether there is a threshold above which the growth of the financial
sector is detrimental to output growth. Complementing their study we investigate the
medium-term combined effect of credit fluctuations and fiscal stimuli imparted to the
economy. We find a number of interesting results. Government expenditure multipliers
are heavily influenced by the cycle and we are able to unambiguously confirm the com-
mon notion of stronger multipliers in average recessions. Furthermore, expansionary
shocks seem to suffer from diminishing returns, where a larger stimulus is not matched
by a proportionally larger GDP reaction. It also appears that the results are strongly
sensitive to the choice of including a measure of fiscal space based on public debt into
the model specification, to the point where the sign of the response is inverted in this
latter case.
The emphasis on public debt is a natural consequence of our approach. While
the link between credit and the business cycle was extensively investigated by Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2015), the interaction between sovereign debt and the financial cycle has
received renewed interest due to the most recent crisis and the subsequent burst of state-
owned debt, giving fresh relevance to the discoveries of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). A
recent analysis on such interaction can be found in the work of Poghosyan (2018), whose
finding – an asymmetrical relation between financial and debt cycles – complements
our own evidence of an asymmetrical and non-proportional output reaction to different
magnitudes of fiscal stimulus. Moreover, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that public debt acts
as a state variable in estimating scale multipliers and where state owned debt is high,
fiscal multipliers tend to be low and fiscal policy ineffective.
To reproduce the fluctuating economy we use the approach of Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012, henceforth AG), adopting a Smooth Transition VAR able to smoothly
change the coefficients between two extreme regimes (a state of absolute contraction/-
expansion of the economy). The choice of a non-linear model is deliberate and a growing
awareness in the literature supports this path, advocating for representations of phe-
nomena closer to reality: indeed, the reality itself is non-linear.1 Departing from AG,
our focus is on the financial cycle rather than the business cycle, and we include the
credit to private non-financial institutions and the public debt among the variables of
interest. Furthermore, unlike AG we choose to use the generalized impulse response
functions (GIRF) analysis pioneered by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998),
modified as in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Pellegrino (2021) to include a struc-
tural shock. This powerful tool allows us to use the entire sample history to study the
response of a truly fluctuating economy, accounting for the possibility that the shock
itself is able to change the way in which the variables interact. We also perform a sce-
nario analysis exercise, investigating which consequences arise if a shock is deliberately
delivered in an alternative fixed setting (the so called scenario) of typical representa-
tive recession or expansion; this amounts to bringing the model to a specific phase of
the business cycle and only then triggering the fiscal expenditure shock. The exercise
is further expanded to explicitly assume the relationship between a fiscal expenditure
shock and the public debt. We establish both an entirely debt-financed expenditure
increase and a budget cut aimed to reduce the outstanding stock of public debt.
The evidence drawn from GIRF analysis strongly suggests the importance of taking
into account the financial environment and the timing of any fiscal stimulus. Moreover,
the existence of diminishing returns to expansionary shocks questions the effectiveness
of expansionary fiscal policy measures. Knowing the way in which a specific fiscal
operation will affect the economy, given the current macroeconomic conditions, is key
in helping policy makers make informed choices.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 details the model and
the data, and Section 2.3 presents the empirical results. Section 2.4 concludes.
1A more compelling case for a change of perspective in economic modelling can be found in Chiu
and Hacioglu Hoke (2016b) and Chiu and Hacioglu Hoke (2016a).
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2.2 Methodology
This section presents the model and discusses generalized impulse response analysis
that will be used to investigate its dynamics.
2.2.1 The Smooth Transition VAR model
Similar to Chapter 1, our model is a Smooth Transition VAR (henceforth STVAR), as
in AG. The STVAR is a multivariate extension by van Dijk et al. (2002) of a univariate
specification proposed by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993). AG further extend it by
allowing the variance covariance matrix of the innovation process to follow the same
smooth transition mechanism. The econometric specification is as follows:
Xt = [(1− F (zt−1))ΠE + F (zt−1)ΠC ] (L)Xt−1 + ut (2.1)
ut ∼ N(0,Ωt) (2.2)





Var(z) = 1 E[z] = 0,
where ΠE and ΠC are again the coefficient matrices corresponding to the extreme
expansion and contraction phases of the cycle, respectively, and X is the data matrix. z
is the state variable acting as the input of the exponential transition function 0 ≤ F ≤ 1;
γ is the parameter controlling the speed of the transition, while the subscripts E and
C refer respectively to expansion and contraction phases of the cycle; the order of the
lag polynomial p is four.
The model has two different channels of transmission for a shock. The lag poly-
nomials ΠE(L) and ΠC(L) in Equation (2.1) constitute the dynamic element, while
the state-contingent shock covariance matrix Ωt in equations (2.2)-(2.3) allows for a
contemporaneous propagation. Given the large number of parameters that need to be
estimated and the non-linear features of the model, we follow AG and use the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo method originally presented in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) with
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and flat priors. As the first order condition in Equation
2.4 shows, for any guess of the variance-covariance matrix Ωt the model linearises and
the optimal value of Π = [ΠE ,ΠR] can be immediately computed. The overall esti-
mation approach, detailed in Appendix A.1, is based upon building up a sequence of
guesses leading to the highest likelihood via MCMC, while the proper model estimation





















Wt = [(1− F (zt−1))Xt−1, F (zt−1)Xt−1 . . . (1− F (zt−1))Xt−p, F (zt−1)Xt−p]
(2.4)
2.2.2 Impulse response functions
As we already discussed in Chapter 1, we need an analysis instrument able to keep
the non-linear features of the model intact. The generalized impulse response analysis
developed by Koop et al. (1996) serves our purposes, since it allows us to set the
economy free to evolve after receiving a shock, a feature critically missing in AG. The
generalized impulse response function is defined as the expectation of the realization
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of Xt conditional on the history (H) and the shock (s) over a baseline conditional
expectation on just the history:
GIX(h, st,Ht−1) = E [Xt+h | Ht−1, st]− E [Xt+h | Ht−1] ,
for the horizon h = 0, 1, . . . .
(2.5)
Since the conditional expectations can be seen as random variables, their difference
GIX(h, st,Ht−1) defined in Equation (2.5) is itself a realization of the random variable
GI. The model is known and explicitly defined, thus we are able to estimate the em-
pirical distribution of its conditional expectations using a Monte Carlo approach, from
which a central moment and confidence bands can be easily computed. The identifi-
cation of fiscal shocks relies on conventional short-run recursive restrictions implied by
the Cholesky decomposition imposed on the vector of reduced form residuals, as shown
in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Pellegrino (2021).
The GIRF analysis is optimal to account for the non-linearity of our model. For
the sake of comparability of results with the general literature on fiscal multipliers,
we also include linear impulse response functions computed in the extreme states of
the cycle. The most striking limitation of this approach is that the results are no
longer state-contingent, as they necessitate selecting one specific value of the transition
function (and therefore a specific phase of the cycle). We follow the example of AG
and present results for the extremes of the cycle, choosing F = {1; 0}, thus assuming
that the economy will always be stuck in either a peak or a trough of the cycle.
2.3 Empirical analysis
In what follows we present the variables and the data included in the analysis, and
discuss our financial cycle estimation strategy. A selection of empirical results is also
presented.
2.3.1 Variables and data
We use U.S. quarterly data from 1966Q1 (1952Q2, for the specification not including
debt) to 2019Q4. Figure 2.1 shows our variables: government expenditure, tax re-
ceipts and GDP are all log real series; public debt and credit to private non-financial
institutions (private credit for short) are normalized by GDP.
Figure 2.1: The data: macroeconomic and financial variables










GDP Gov. Consumption Tax revenues
(a) Macroeconomic variables










Private credit Federal debt
(b) Financial variables
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Log real data of (a) Government Expenditure, Tax Revenues, GDP, and (b) Public Debt, Private
Credit (both normalized by GDP).
The choice of government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP is standard in the
VAR literature related to fiscal multipliers starting with Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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Since our estimation of the financial cycle relies on credit to private non-financial in-
stitutions, this is included in the VAR to allow the dynamic computation of non-linear
impulse responses. We specifically choose public debt in light of its relationship with
fiscal multipliers identified by Perotti (1999) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013), both finding that
high levels of fiscal burden (debt-to-gdp ratio) are able to impair fiscal policy, shrinking
the size of fiscal multipliers. Furthermore, we believe that controlling for public debt
is a natural choice to complement the deficit dynamics. We estimate the model in first
differences to ensure stationarity.
2.3.2 The financial cycle
To obtain an estimate of the financial cycle, we adopt the approach of Drehmann
et al. (2012) and Borio (2014), relying on frequency analysis. Specifically, we apply the
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) passband filter to isolate and extract the so called
medium-term frequency components of the cycle, that is the components oscillating
with a frequency between 32 and 120 quarters (8 and 30 years). The choice of frequency
analysis over the longer historied turning-point analysis is dictated by the need to have
an explicit value of the cycle for each quarter, instead of an estimate of maximum and
minimum points.
Our result is comparable with previous literature estimates, even if we drastically
reduce the number of variables considered from five to just one: the credit to private
non-financial institutions, normalized by GDP. This choice allows us to base the esti-
mation of the financial cycle on one of the variables included in the model specification,
as required for the use of generalized impulse response analysis. To allow a comparison,
we also include an estimate of the business cycle obtained as in AG. Figure 2.2 below
shows our estimate of the financial cycle. NBER recessions and a simple estimate of
the business cycle are also reported for comparison.
Figure 2.2: Business cycle, financial cycle and NBER chronology








NBER recessions Business cycle Financial cycle
Note: The business cycle is the MA(7) of the ouput growth; the financial cycle is obtained via a band
pass filter extracting the components fluctuating with frequency 32-120 quarters.
2.3.3 Impulse responses
Our focus is on the response of GDP to a fiscal shock via government expenditure.
Together with the non-linear impulse responses presented above in Section 2.2.2, we
also provide for comparison linear responses computed using the two extreme regime
matrices identified by the model, ΠE and ΠR of Equation (2.1). This amounts to
showing the IRFs of two distinct linear models with no interaction with each other.
A baseline and a debt augmented specification are considered for the set of Xt
variables, namely Xt = [gt, τt, yt, P ct] and Xt = [gt, τt, dt, yt, P ct], where g denotes
government expenditure; τ is tax revenues; y represents GDP; Pc is private credit
(normalized by GDP); and d denotes public debt (normalized by GDP). All variables
are first differences of the log real series. We consider shocks of ±1% and ±5% to U.S.
2.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 27
government expenditure, roughly corresponding to ±0.15% and ±0.8% of GDP. While
the larger shock may look too large, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009 (2009) stimulus package delivered an estimated combined impact of
roughly 2.5% of GDP in the first year of enactment, as explained in The Congress of
the United States - Congressional Budget Office (2012). Furthermore, the most recent
debate on a grand stimulus package encourages us to be confident in using a relatively
large shock.
We also perform a scenario analysis considering two different environments in which
the fiscal shock is delivered: a typical expansion and a typical recession. This comple-
ments the results presented in the main section, where the shock is timed to the most
recent phase of the cycle. Our methodology involves building a typical regime-specific
history of quarters and appending it to the history of realizations, effectively feeding
the recursive mechanism of the model with an artificial set of values. This allows us
to use the GIRF approach to investigate the effects of a fiscal shock imposed during a
specific state of the economy and the cycle without sacrificing the smooth transitioning
nature of our model. To build such a history, we use a discriminating criterion – the
chronology published by the National Bureau of Economic Research of business cycle
dates (as in Figure 2.2) – and we select every quarter in any given regime together
with its lags. We then take the median value of the variables, thus obtaining a median
representative recessionary or expansionary history. Appendix B.3 shows that the main
results still hold when the transition F function is used as a criterion and recession and
expansion are defined as the quarters where the function is, respectively, higher than
0.8 or lower than 0.2.
To further explore the dynamics of fiscal shocks, GDP, and debt reactions of the
augmented baseline, we also explicitly assume the relation between a government ex-
penditure shock and the outstanding stock of public debt. We keep our methodology
as simple and straightforward as possible and we impart a contemporaneous shock of
the same size, and opposite sign, to both government expenditure and the stock of pub-
lic debt, thus assuming that every expenditure increase is entirely financed via deficit
spending and, at the same time, that a budget cut is only aimed to restructuring the
stock of debt.
Baseline specification
We start by presenting results for our baseline specification, including the main variables
of government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP, augmented by private credit, that
is Xt = [gt, τt, yt, P ct]. We show results for both the full sample, up to the last
quarter of 2019, and for a shorter sample not including the Great Recession. Figure
2.3 presents the GDP responses to a fiscal expenditure shock for the full sample.
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Figure 2.3: Baseline specification, GDP reaction


















  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF
Note: Cumulative linear (a) and generalized (b) impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a) or to percentages of government expenditure (b) fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the
variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR includes public
expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
The linear model clearly shows that the impact reaction to the same shock is
stronger during an expansion period, rather than a contraction. The peak value reached
is also higher when the economy is flourishing, despite happening during the same quar-
ter for both the regimes, about a year after the shock. However, the long-run value
is similar and in both cases it falls around the unity. The shock response also looks
strongly pro-cyclical.
The generalized impulse responses present a number of interesting points. First, the
impact and the long-run equilibrium value of the GDP reaction are opposite in sign,
drawing a clear line between short, and medium and long-term equilibrium. Moreover,
while the shocks are linearly scaled, the responses are not. Evidently there exists a
phenomenon of diminishing returns to increasing shocks, where a larger negative shock
has a limited, non-proportional, expansionary effect on the economy. The existence of
such an asymmetric effect further justifies the choice of a non-linear model. Finally,
negative expenditure shocks yield a positive GDP reaction and vice versa, seemingly
endorsing austerity-like policies á la Alesina and Ardagna (2013). This is similar to
the phenomenon found in Chapter 1, which we imputed to the presence of the Great
Recession within the sample. Indeed this seems to be the case again, as results shown
in Figure 2.4 suggest.
Figure 2.4: Shorter baseline (not including the Great Recession), GDP reaction


























  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF
Note: Cumulative linear (a) and generalized (b) impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a) or to percentages of government expenditure (b) fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the
variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR includes public
expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
Setting aside the differences due to a shorter sample (limited to the fourth quarter of
2008), the main divergence from the baseline is the effect of negative (positive) shocks
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being negative (positive) on the economy, a result already encountered in Chapter 1.
A significant commonality, on the other hand, is the persistence of the diminishing
returns of expansionary (in their effects) shocks, where there seems to be a limit to
how much the economy is boostable via fiscal stimulus.
Figure 2.5 shows instead the response of the ratio of private credit-to-GDP, which we
take as an indicator of the financial environment as already shown in Borio (2014). Two
features are worth mentioning: the difference between a more dynamic short-run and a
stabler long-run, and the marked difference between smaller and larger stimuli. Since
the GDP reaction in Figure 2.3 looks smooth at every horizon, the overall conclusion
we can draw is that the private credit reacts robustly pro-cyclically only after the
short-period, pushing the ratio in the same direction as the GDP.
Figure 2.5: Baseline specification, credit-to-GDP response






















  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF
Note: Cumulative linear (a) and generalized (b) impulse responses. Percentage private credit response
to a unit standard deviation (a) or to percentages of government expenditure (b) fiscal shock. ∆G
denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR
includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and
95th percentile.
Scenario analysis, baseline specification
State-contingent IRFs computed in what we defined as typical expansions and typical
recessions, and presented in Figure 2.6, feature a number of striking differences, aside
from the general dynamic of the GDP response. In a typical expansion the fiscal stim-
ulus is pro-cyclical and smaller in absolute value than in a typical recession. Moreover,
the phenomenon of diminishing returns to larger shocks appears only during typical
expansion, to the point where the long-term expansionary effect of a larger fiscal shock
is almost identical to the response of the smaller one and very close to zero.
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Figure 2.6: Baseline specification, scenario analysis












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Typical expansion












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Typical recession
Note: Cumulative generalized impulse responses to a fiscal shock delivered in a median representative
recession or expansion. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size
of the shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence
bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
Augmented specification
Next we change the model specification to Xt = [gt, τt, dt, yt, P ct], augmenting the
previous one with public debt. Rather than including it as it is, we choose to normalize
it by GDP to obtain not a measure of the debt stock as such, but rather an indicator
of fiscal burden relative to the size of the economy.
Due to data availability our sample is now shorter, starting in 1966Q1. Appendix
B.1 shows that estimating the baseline specification over the same shorter sample does
not change the key empirical evidence presented. Figure 2.7 illustrates GDP reaction
to a fiscal shock under the new specification.
Figure 2.7: Augmented specification, GDP response




















  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF
Note: Cumulative linear (a) and generalized (b) impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a) or to percentages of government expenditure (b) fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the
variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR includes public
expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th
percentile.
Linear responses are now more diverse and less clearly identified, likely due to the
lower number of observations used to estimate coefficients for one more variable. If
the response during an extreme expansion appears rather stable, the contraction phase
yields more dynamic behaviour, with a medium- and long-run response definitely larger
than the expansionary counterpart.
The non-linear GIRFs keep some of the features shown by the baseline specification,
such as the inversion in the sign of the responses between short and long periods, the
impact effect being considerably smaller than the equilibrium long-run value, and the
presence of diminishing returns of the expansionary response, where the larger shock
does not yield a proportionally larger reaction. However, the most striking difference is
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in the concordance of the sign of shocks and reactions, where now a positive (negative)
fiscal shock brings forth a positive (negative) GDP response. Such an effect appears
to be entirely due to augmenting the specification with the ratio of public debt-to-
GDP rather than due to the reduced sample size, as clearly shown in Appendix B.1
where a baseline specification estimated on the shorter sample preserves the discordance
between sign of the shock and sign of the corresponding IRF.
To complement our analysis, Figure 2.8 presents the evolution of the private credit-
to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP following the fiscal shock.
Figure 2.8: Augmented specification, credit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP response










  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Generalised IRF












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF
Note: Generalised impulse responses. Percentage private credit and debt response to a fiscal shock.
∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR
includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, GDP and private credit. Confidence bands are
at 5th and 95th percentile.
The credit behaviour is consistent with what we already observed for the baseline
specification: results suggest that private credit moves strongly pro-cyclically, as a
positive (negative) stimulus is paired with a growth (fall) of the private credit-to-GDP
ratio. On the other hand, the behaviour of public debt-to-GDP ratio appears to be
more diverse. Results clearly suggest that public debt variation will have the same
sign as the fiscal shock. Rather than interpreting the result as public debt moving pro-
cyclically, we favour the intuition that the fiscal shock itself is connected to the debt
via deficit expansion of reduction. In this context, the long-run change in behaviour of
the ratio after a larger negative shock can be seen as a first pro-cyclical moment, where
the budget cut puts a downward pressure on the GDP, and it is directly used to lower
the amount of public debt, followed by a phase where the debt dynamic wanes out (or
even slightly rebounds), thus pushing up the ratio.
Scenario analysis, augmented specification
Figure 2.9 presents the scenario analysis for our extended specification. Some key
features of the general result of Figure 2.7 are carried over, such as the concordance
between sign of the shock and sign of the response, the presence of a diminishing
returns effect for the larger expansionary shock, and a discrepancy in the sign of the
response between short- and long-run limited to the typical recession scenario. The
most striking feature, however, is again that responses in a typical recession are larger
than in a typical expansion.
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Figure 2.9: Augmented specification, scenario analysis
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(a) Typical expansion










  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Typical recession
Note: Cumulative generalized impulse responses to a fiscal shock delivered in a median representative
recession or expansion. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size
of the shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
A simple extension of the scenario analysis would be to explicitly assume how the
fiscal shock influences the stock of public debt. We simulate an expenditure increase
financed via public debt and a debt consolidation achieved via a one-time budget cut.
Figure 2.10 shows that the results are qualitatively similar to the case of a typical
expansion, with slightly higher magnitudes of responses in the short-run, and then
lower in the long-term. On the other hand, the dynamics appear more diverse in a
typical recession scenario. In the first place, we now have two inversions in the sign
of the responses, one immediately after the impact and the other about two years in.
However, such inversions do not affect the larger positive shock. Overall, the message
yielded by the scenario is truly insightful: both large and small debt consolidations
during a recession end up being recessionary, exactly as with the case of a large fiscal
stimulus. The only strategy which appears successful in boosting the economy when
the stimulus weighs entirely on debt is a small-sized fiscal package.
Figure 2.10: Augmented specification, scenario analysis with a shock to public debt












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Typical expansion








  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Typical recession
Note: Cumulative generalized impulse responses to a fiscal shock delivered in a median representative
recession or expansion. The same shock is applied with opposite signs to government expenditure
and public debt. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of
the shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
2.4 Conclusion
A Smooth Transition VAR was adopted to allow the economy to fluctuate with the
financial cycle. This choice is believed to have proven its worth. Our empirical ev-
idence yields a plethora of conclusions, both for the baseline and for the extended
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specifications, where we control for public debt. A number of interesting asymmetries
are brought to light, both between positive and negative shocks and in the response
to larger government expenditure variations. Thus, the rich dynamics of public debt
should not be excluded from the model.
The baseline specification shows that in a post-Great Recession world fiscal stim-
uli tend to favour an austerity-like approach, where budget cuts boost the economy,
whereas fiscal expansions lead to recessions. However, the model also highlights a phe-
nomenon of diminishing returns to increasing expansionary (in their effects) measures,
where a more consistent cut does not bring a proportionally larger GDP expansion.
Looking at the behaviour of the private credit-to-GDP ratio, the private credit compo-
nent seems to react strongly pro-cyclically after the short-term horizon. Extending the
specification with public debt completely changes the sign of the GDP reaction to a
fiscal shock, meaning that a positive stimulus is expansionary and vice-versa, thus re-
versing the endorsement to austerity-like measures provided by the baseline. However,
some important features are preserved, as the crucial effect of diminishing returns to
larger expansionary stimuli, questioning how much the economy can be boosted by a
fiscal shock. The analysis of the credit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio responses after
a shock is broadly consistent with the baseline specification in the case of the former,
while the behaviour of the latter is fully consistent with fiscal expenditure shocks weigh-
ing on public debt being at least partially financed by (or used to reduce the amount
of) public debt.
For both specifications, the scenario analyses show the traditional finding that mul-
tipliers are larger in a typical recession rather then an expansion. A further extension
of the exercise, in which the fiscal stimulus is entirely financed via public debt (or the
budget cut is entirely spent in debt reduction) acts as warning about the risks of cut-
ting public expenditure in recession as well as the danger of legislating an expansionary
package that is excessively reliant on deficit.
From a policy perspective, both the diminishing returns to growing fiscal stimuli
and the intricate dynamics of debt-financed packages advocate for caution when linear
models, unable to capture such a degree of complexity, are used to simulate the effect of
real-world policies. If the debt dynamics call for further and more specific investigation,
the diminishing returns implicitly question the efficiency of any large expansionary
package and suggest that a state-contingent golden return ratio may exist.
Chapter 3




We consider a fluctuating economy along a combined economic cycle carrying informa-
tion on both real activity and the financial sector, and focus on the state contingency
of the effects of a fiscal stimulus. Specifically, we adopt a non-linear Smooth Transition
VAR and we show the cumulative effect of a government expenditure policy shock. In
line with what we find especially in Chapter 2, there are diminishing returns in terms of
effect on GDP to a larger expansionary shock. Moreover, controlling for private credit
and public debt does not qualitatively change the result shown by the baseline model.
We attribute the stability of the key features of the specifications to the use of a cycle
which already includes information about the financial sector and fiscal space. We also
perform a scenario analysis exercise, delivering fiscal shocks either in an average con-
traction or in an average expansion of the cycle. We find unequivocal evidence that the
fiscal expenditures multipliers are on average larger in a typical recession, rather that
in an expansion, a result consistent with our findings in Chapter 2 and stable across
all specifications used.
The cyclical behaviour of GDP – commonly known as the business cycle – has
been widely accepted in the literature since Burns and Mitchell (1946) and, starting
with Mankiw (1989), it has more recently been interpreted as the tell-tale sign of
underlying economic fluctuations. Business cycle theories have by now become common
and influential (Zarnowitz, 1992; Laidler, 1999; and Besomi, 2006). At the same time,
even though the notion of financial booms and busts that could impact the economy is
not new, the financial world came to assume an the ancillary role of either an accelerator
or a delayer of the return to the natural steady state of the economy (Bernanke et al.,
1999). Because of this, it came to be seen as something that could be ignored in
first approximation (Woodford, 2003) and progressively disappeared from mainstream
macroeconomics.
The financial crisis forcefully brought the spotlight back to the concept of “finan-
cially induced crisis” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014; Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision, 2010; Jordà et al., 2017; and Ball, 2014) and triggered a growing advocacy to,
in the words of Jordà et al. (2017), “take finance seriously”. The intertwined nature
of the real and financial economy has since been explored in depth. Arcand et al.
(2015) consider whether there is a threshold over which the growth of the financial
sector becomes detrimental to output. Credit and business cycle share a relationship
investigated by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), while Ilzetzki et al. (2013) show how high
levels of public debt make fiscal policy ineffective. The idea of a procyclicality of the
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financial system has become increasingly popular (Borio et al., 2001, Dańıelsson et al.,
2004, Kashyap and Stein, 2004, Brunnermeier et al., 2009, and Adrian and Song Shin,
2010), however there is still no broad consensus on what exactly a financial cycle is or
how to measure it -with the notable exception of Drehmann et al. (2012).
The notion of time-varying behaviour within any given economy is crucial in the field
of state contingency of fiscal multipliers, focusing on the ways in which the economy
reacts differently to the same fiscal policy measure in different times. This amounts to
believing that there exists a state variable on which fiscal multipliers are contingent,
which in the literature is, commonly, considered to be the business cycle (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2012; Callegari et al., 2012; Galvão and Owyang, 2018; Bolboaca and
Fischer, 2019; Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016; and Bruns and Piffer, 2019). We focus
instead on a combined economic cycle, ideally merging the information coming from
the business and the financial cycle, here loosely defined as the medium- and long-run
fluctuations of various housing, interest rate, and stock market component variables.
We make our economy proceed along such a cycle in an effort to better reproduce its
evolution accounting for both real and financial drivers.
We specifically control for private credit to non-financial institutions and public
debt, both normalized by GDP. The emphasis on measures of financial stress and fiscal
burden comes from a deliberate effort to take the finance sector seriously. Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2015) have already explored the pro-cyclical inter-linkages between credit and
the business cycle, while the stifling effect of public debt on growth has already been
substantiated in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and later further confirmed by Poghosyan
(2018), whose findings – an asymmetrical relation between financial and debt cycles
– particularly complement our own evidence of an asymmetrical and non-proportional
output reaction to fiscal shocks. Moreover, we also find some empirical evidence that a
growing amount of public debt is associated with a crippled GDP expansion, a crucial
result already showcased in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) that highlights the complex relationship
between public debt and economic growth.
The fluctuation along the economic cycle is reproduced using the approach of Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012, henceforth AG): a Smooth Transition VAR able to
smoothly change the coefficients between two extreme regimes (a state of absolute con-
traction or expansion of the economy). The choice of a non-linear model is supported
on one side by a growing awareness in the literature that complex phenomena require
non-linear modelling techniques, and by a need to produce comparable results to those
shown in Chapter 2.
Building further on the approach of AG, we focus on our economic cycle and we
augment the model with, in turn, private credit and public debt. Furthermore, we
add to the strictly linear impulse responses, as we use the generalized impulse response
functions – GIRF – analysis pioneered by Koop et al. (1996). Detaching from the
original approach, we are able to let go of the unintuitive assumption that after the
shock is delivered, the model is stuck in one perpetual phase of the cycle, de facto
suppressing the non-linear nature of the analysis. Generalised impulses are a powerful
technique allowing enough flexibility to set the economy free to evolve according to its
own mechanics. We further modify the original GIRF – the algorithm of Pesaran and
Shin (1998) – to allow for structural government expenditure shocks.
The evidence drawn from GIRF analysis strongly supports the use of a cycle rich
in information about the financial sector. Interestingly, we find that extending our
baseline yields the same key features of the baseline specification, while a much more
significant change in results is observed when we change the scenario in which the fiscal
shock is delivered. From a policy perspective, the crucial result that expansionary
stimuli are subject to diminishing returns questions the ability of fiscal policy to boost
the economy at all. At the same time, it becomes evident that a better knowledge of
the non-linear interactions taking place inside an economy is crucial to policy makers
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who want to make informed and efficient decisions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 details the model and
the data, and Section 3.3 presents the empirical results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
This section reiterates the model and discusses the generalized impulse response analysis
that will be used to investigate its dynamics, as a general reminder from Chapter 2.
3.2.1 The Smooth Transition VAR model
Our model of choice, the STVAR, is again the multivariate extension by van Dijk
et al. (2002) of the univariate Smooth Transition AR introduced by Granger and
Teräsvirta (1993). A further extension by AG adds the Smooth Transition dynamics
to the variance-covariance matrix of the innovation process, allowing it to also become
state-contingent. The econometric specification is as follows:
Xt = [(1− F (zt−1))ΠE + F (zt−1)ΠC ] (L)Xt−1 + ut (3.1)
ut ∼ N(0,Ωt) (3.2)





Var(z) = 1 E[z] = 0,
We already know that ΠE and ΠC are the coefficient matrices corresponding to
the extreme states of the cycle and X is the data matrix. The transition function
0 ≤ F ≤ 1 governing the shift between the phases is in turn determined by the state-
contingent variable z. γ is the parameter controlling the speed and the smoothness
of the transition; the subscripts E and C again refer respectively to expansion and
contraction phases of the cycle.
As we already pointed out, the model has two channels of transmission for shocks.
The dynamic channel goes through the lag polynomials ΠE(L) and ΠC(L) in Equation
(3.1), while the state-contingent variance-covariance matrix Ωt in equations (3.2)-(3.3)
acts as a contemporaneous propagation mechanism. The model features a large number
of parameters to be estimated and it shows true non-linearity in the parameters, since
the data matrix will be augmented with the economic cycle. However, after taking the
first order condition as in Equation 3.4, it becomes apparent that the model becomes
linear for any given guess of the variance-covariance matrices sΩE and ΩC and the





















Wt = [(1− F (zt−1))Xt−1, F (zt−1)Xt−1 . . . (1− F (zt−1))Xt−p, F (zt−1)Xt−p]
(3.4)
We apply the same estimation strategy as AG, as described in Appendix A.1, and
we use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method presented in Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003), with Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and flat priors, to build building up a
sequence of guesses leading to the highest likelihood. While the overall estimation
procedure has Bayesian features, the model estimation step sees the use of GLS.
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3.2.2 Impulse response functions
Since the model we are going to use possesses interesting non-linear features, we would
like to preserve them in the analysis phase. This is not a trivial endeavour: the original
AG work featured linear orthogonalized impulse response functions, assuming that the
the model would perpetually stay in the same phase in which the shock was delivered.
We regard such an assumption as generally difficult to defend and contrasting with the
whole spirit of this thesis. Therefore, we again turn to the generalised impulse response
analysis pioneered by Koop et al. (1996) and further described by Pesaran and Shin
(1998).
The intuitive definition of the future effect of a shock on a system is the difference
between the expectation of the shocked system and that of a baseline where the shock
never happened. The formal definition of generalized impulse is as follows
GIX(h, st,Ht−1) = E [Xt+h | Ht−1, st]− E [Xt+h | Ht−1] ,
for the horizon h = 0, 1, . . . .
(3.5)
The generalised impulse GIX(h, st,Ht−1) is defined as the difference between the
system expectation conditional on the history of realizations (H) or on the history and
the shock (s), thus averaging out future innovations that do not interest us. Both the
conditional expectations can be seen as random variables, which makes GI a random
variable itself. Since our model is known and specified, we can compute the expectations
and then estimate the empirical distribution ofGI. It is then sufficient to pick a measure
of centrality of the distribution as the estimate of the shock and one of dispersion to
serve as error.
We further develop the traditional analysis and we slightly modify the algorithm,
as suggested by Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Pellegrino (2021). We use the model
reduced-form residuals to estimate the structural innovations, therefore identifying fis-
cal shocks, via the usual short-run recursive restriction of the Cholesky decomposition.
The algorithm modification sacrifices the traditional irrelevance of the ordering of vari-
ables, one of the distinctive features of the traditional GIRF approach.
3.3 Empirical analysis
In what follows, we detail the variables and the data included in the analysis, and
discuss the estimation strategy followed to create our economic cycle. A selection of
empirical results is also presented.
3.3.1 Variables and data
We use U.S. quarterly data from 1966Q1 (1952Q2, for the specification not including
debt) to 2019Q4. Figure 3.1 presents our variables: Government expenditure, tax
receipts and GDP are all log real series; public debt and credit to private non financial
institutions (for short, henceforth private credit) are normalized by GDP.
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Figure 3.1: The data: macroeconomic and financial variables
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(a) Macroeconomic variables










Private credit Federal debt
(b) Financial variables
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Log real data of (a) Government Expenditure, Tax Revenues, GDP, and (b) Public Debt, Private
Credit (both normalized by GDP).
Government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP has constituted the standard
selection when estimating fiscal multipliers ever since Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Every specification includes the estimate of the economic cycle to allow for dynamic
computation of truly non-linear impulse responses. The choice of private credit as
a single indicator of financial stress is justified by the findings of Borio (2014) and
Drehmann et al. (2012), who explicitly single out this variable as the carrier of all
information on the financial sector. We already justified the choice of public debt in
Chapter 2, pointing out that its relationship with fiscal multipliers has been identified
by Perotti (1999) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013). Both studies find that a high level of
fiscal burden, expressed as debt-to-GDP ratio, is able to cripple fiscal policy and quash
the size of fiscal multipliers. Furthermore, we believe that model already features
implicit deficit dynamics (as it includes public expenditures and revenues) and we see
the inclusion of public debt as a natural complement. We estimate the model in first
differences to ensure stationarity.
3.3.2 The economic cycle
The leading intuition behind our economic cycle is that the economy is contemporane-
ously under the influence of both a real and a financial cycle. To retrieve a measure
able to include information about both worlds, we make use of FRED-MD, a macroe-
conomic database of 128 variables related to the U.S. economy at monthly frequency.
The database, an ideal extension of the work of Stock and Watson (1996), is described
and detailed at length in the accompanying paper (McCracken and Ng, 2016), and
partially in Appendix C.1. The panel is formed by 742 monthly observations, from
1959:01 to 2020:10, but we limit the data we use to 2019:12, in line with the macro and
financial variables. The first 2 observations are lost to perform data transformation to
achieve stationarity and several series have missing observations at the beginning of
the sample, making the panel unbalanced.
To build a synthetic measure of a comprehensive real and financial cycle, we follow
a three-step approach. First, we need to efficiently extract the information from the
monthly series. To this purpose, we follow McCracken and Ng (2016) in reducing the
dimension of our database with a factor analysis strategy. Second, using the same
reasoning as found in Chapter 2, we filter the factor scores to isolate the short- and
medium-term components of the business cycle and the medium- and long-run frequen-
cies of the financial cycle. Third, we project GDP onto the components to estimate the
overall economic cycle and smooth it with a year long moving average.
It is well established that in large T and N settings,1 static or dynamic principal
1Where T and N are, respectively, the number of observations and the number of variables.
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components can be a consistent estimate of latent factors (see, Forni et al. (2005,
2000); Stock and Watson (2006); Boivin and Ng (2005); Bai and Ng (2008)). Since we
have missing observations, we estimate the factors using the EM algorithm given in
Stock and Watson (2002), which allows for a conveniently simple treatment of missing
observations. After demeaning and standardizing the series, in the first iteration of
the algorithm we rebalance the panel, initializing all empty observations to 0. Given a
number r of factors, we estimate matrix T × r of factor scores F = (f1, . . . , fT ) paired
with a N × r matrix of loadings Λ = (λ1, . . . , λN )′ under the normalization Λ
′Λ
N = Ir.
For each missing observation t of the ith series, the initial 0 guess is updated to λ̂i
′
f̂t,
multiplied by the standard deviation of the series. Finally, the mean is added back and
the resulting value is considered the tth observations of the ith series, which we demean
and standardize again with the updated mean and standard deviation. The algorithm
iterates until the estimated factors do not change any more.
Several criteria, imposing different assumptions upon the factor model, are available
to find the optimal r number of significant factors. Bai and Ng (2002) proposed the
PCp criteria, which minimize the number of factors chosen, imposing a penalty of
log(min(N,T ))
min(N,T ) to keep the model parsimonious. Since min(N,T )
−1 ≈ N+TNT when N,T →
∞, several functional forms of the criteria can be specified. We choose the specification
with the better finite sample properties, N+TT log(min(N,T )), corresponding to the
PCp2 criterion in Bai and Ng (2002). The criterion selects seven significant factors,
eight if the sample is not limited to 2019, as Appendix C.2 shows.
Once the r = 7 factors are estimated, we regress each series on an increasing subset
of them to compute a measure of how much variability the orthogonal factors are
able to explain for each series. That is, for the ith series and for each factor k =
1, . . . , r we compute R2i (k) and an average across series yields how much a k given




i (k). Similarly, the marginal
gain in explanatory power for the ith series obtained from adding an extra factor
is, from the second factor onward, the difference in the ith series R-square values
mR2i (k) = R
2
i (k)−R2i (k − 1), k = 2, . . . , r. In the case of the single-factor subset, the
additional explanatory power trivially coincides with the overall variance explained, so
that mR2i (1) = R
2
i (1). We can compute how much adding a factor on average increases
the average explanatory power over the whole panel, taking the mean of the marginal





Table 3.1 lists the overall variance explained by the factors, R2(r), along with the
ten series which load the most on each kth factor; that is, the series featuring the
highest mR2i (k). A description of all the variables used in the analysis is available in
Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.1: Estimated factors and heavy loading series - R2(7) = 0.4480
mR2(1) 0.1441 mR2(2) 0.0718 mR2(3) 0.0680 mR2(4) 0.0551
payems 0.7092 cusr0000sac 0.6921 aaaffm 0.5399 gs1 0.5123
usgood 0.7006 dndgrg3m086sbea 0.6805 t10yffm 0.5315 gs5 0.5004
ipmansics 0.6833 cusr0000sa0l2 0.6593 baaffm 0.5163 aaa 0.4894
indpro 0.6513 cpiaucsl 0.6407 t5yffm 0.4746 tb6ms 0.4714
manemp 0.6430 cusr0000sa0l5 0.6053 tb3smffm 0.4108 gs10 0.4602
dmanemp 0.6112 cpitrnsl 0.5816 tb6smffm 0.3926 baa 0.4488
ipfpnss 0.6034 pcepi 0.5783 t1yffm 0.3318 cp3mx 0.3757
cumfns 0.5897 cpiulfsl 0.5232 houst 0.2364 tb3ms 0.3732
ipfinal 0.5041 wpsfd49502 0.4593 houstmw 0.1954 twexafegsmthx 0.2230
ipdmat 0.4751 wpsfd49207 0.4417 houstne 0.1910 s&p div yield 0.1975
mR2(5) 0.0431 mR2(6) 0.0342 mR2(7) 0.0317
t1yffm 0.3174 awhman 0.2695 s&p 500 0.4945
tb6smffm 0.2705 ces0600000007 0.2632 s&p: indust 0.4915
t5yffm 0.2443 uemp15ov 0.2045 s&p div yield 0.3655
tb3smffm 0.2288 s&p pe ratio 0.1807 s&p pe ratio 0.2560
permit 0.2231 uemp27ov 0.1668 umcsentx 0.2341
permitw 0.2147 acogno 0.1478 vxoclsx 0.1836
houstw 0.1985 isratiox 0.1464 ipcongd 0.0864
t10yffm 0.1869 ipcongd 0.1400 excausx 0.0640
houst 0.1753 s&p div yield 0.1174 ipfinal 0.0621
compapffx 0.1740 uempmean 0.1007 ipdcongd 0.0501
Note: Seven factors selected by the PCp2 criterion and the ten series loading the most on each factor.
The table also reports the total variation explained by the seven factors (R2(7)), and the additional
variation explained by adding the kth factor (mR2(k)). As an example, the seven factors explain
together 44.80% of the panel variation, while mR2(1) = 0.1441 is the quota explained solely by the
first factor. Moreover, 0.7092 is the fraction of variation in the variable payems explained by the first
factor.
Factor 1 explains 0.1441 of the variation in the data and is easily interpreted as a
real activity factor, since it is mostly loaded by series relating to industrial production
and employment. The second factor, contributing 0.0718 to the whole variation in data,
mainly affects price variables and can be read as an inflation factor. Both the third and
the fifth factors feature forward-looking variables such as term interest rates spreads
and inventories, with a more modest contribution from real estate variables. Factor 4
is dominated by interest rate variables, and factor 6 contributes mostly to employment
variables, with some influence from stock market and financial variables. The last
factor mostly explains stock market variables. Figure 3.2 shows the end product of
our strategy, an economic cycle built from information on both the real economy and
financial variables, also including employment and stock market information. The
business cycle used in Chapter 1 and the financial cycle which was central to Chapter 2
are included for comparison. The economic cycle appears broadly well correlated with
the NBER recessionary periods, while at the same time featuring a smoothness and an
amplitude closer to the financial oscillations, rather than to the business cycle.
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Figure 3.2: The economic cycle








NBER recessions Business cycle Financial cycle Economic cycle
Note: The business cycle is the MA(7) of the ouput growth; the financial cycle is obtained via a band
pass filter extracting the components fluctuating with frequency 32-120 quarters. The economic cycle
is the smoothed GDP projection onto seven factor scores carrying information about the real economy,
production, interest rates and financial markets.
3.3.3 Impulse responses
Our focus is on the response of GDP to a fiscal government expenditure shock. We
consider three different specifications of the variables in Xt: a standard BP-like Xt =
[zt, gt, τt, yt], acting as the baseline, and two extended specifications, one with public
debt and the other with private credit, similarly to the approach we took in Chap-
ter 2 —while sample limitations prevent us from adopting a specification augmented
with both. Let g denote government expenditure; τ is tax revenues; y is GDP; Pc
denotes private credit (normalized by GDP); and d denotes public debt (normalized by
GDP). All variables are first differences of the log real series and each STVAR model
is augmented by the estimate of the economic cycle, denoted by the variable z. The
shocks considered roughly correspond to ±0.15% and ±0.8% of GDP, namely ±1% and
±5% of U.S. government expenditure. The choice of a 5% shock is in line with the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (2009) stimulus package,
which delivered an estimated combined impact of roughly 2.5% of GDP in the first
year of enactment, as detailed in The Congress of the United States - Congressional
Budget Office (2012). Furthermore, the most recent recession is already calling for an
extremely large stimulus package, rumoured to be around 10% of GDP in total size.
As in Chapter 2, we perform a scenario analysis, delivering a shock when the model
is artificially brought to an average, representative recession or expansion. This allows
us to investigate the consequences of shocks of several sizes and signs impacting an
economy in a well-defined state. We use our economic cycle to discriminate strong
expansions from deep recessions and we select the quarters for each regime together
with their lags, that is we build two synthetic histories of realizations. After taking the
median, we augment our natural history with this synthetic data, effectively feeding
the autoregressive mechanism of the model with representative values of the regime of
interest, simulating a state of the economy to be in a median recession or expansion.
Baseline specification
We first present results for the baseline specification Xt = [zt, gt, τt, yt], which is
consistent with the model specification used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Figure
3.3 shows both the linear and the non-linear impulse responses. As in Chapter 2, linear
IRFs are used as a comparison in the unlikely scenario in which the transition function
is stuck to either 0 or 1, thus collapsing the model to a standard linear VAR.
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Figure 3.3: Baseline specification, GDP reaction






















  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF
Note: Cumulative linear (a) and generalized (b) impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a) or to percentages of government expenditure (b) fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the
variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR includes public
expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
Overall, the results appear similar to the debt-augmented specification we presented
in Section 2.3.3, with an even clearer message. Linear responses again appear rather
stable after the very short horizon. Furthermore, they point unequivocally to fiscal
shock in recession being more effective than in expansion, especially considering the
longer horizon, a result we will investigate further with the scenario analysis exercise.
The generalized responses, on the other hand, present again many of the points we
already made in the previous chapter. There is concordance between the sign of the
shock and the sign of the response, since a positive fiscal stimulus will have a positive
effect on GDP and a budget cut will, on the other hand, yield a contractionary effect.
We again find a clear phenomenon of diminishing returns to increasing expansionary
stimuli, to the point where a larger budget expansion will only lead to a larger effect in
the short-medium horizon. A larger cut in expenditure, on the other hand, appears to
cause a smooth decline in GDP, taking a longer time to stabilize. Furthermore, there is
no more difference between the impact and the medium-long horizon of the responses,
with the effect being consistently positive or negative for all the quarters.
Scenario analysis, baseline specification
To shed some light on the question of whether expenditure multipliers are larger in (a
typical) recession or expansion, Figure 3.4 presents evidence from the scenario analysis
exercise using only the baseline specification.
Figure 3.4: Baseline specification, scenario analysis generalized IRFs












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Typical expansion












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Typical recession
Note: Cumulative generalized impulse responses to a fiscal shock delivered in a median representative
recession or expansion. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the
size of the shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP. Confidence bands are
at 5th and 95th percentile.
3.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 43
A number of differences appear evident as we compare the two scenarios. In a
typical expansion, the GDP reaction to a fiscal shock appears to be more symmetric
to the sign of the shock. Even the phenomenon of diminishing returns is weak to the
point of being negligible. A representative recession yields a more diverse reaction to a
fiscal expenditure shock. The responses are no longer symmetric and negative shocks
produce a larger effect. Moreover, it is again evident that there are diminishing returns
to larger expansionary measures. At the same time, some key characteristics noted in
the baseline scenario still hold in this exercise, such as the concordance in sign between
impact and long-run response. Crucially, positive shocks are still expansionary, and
budget cuts lead to recession in both scenarios. Overall, whether fiscal multipliers are
larger during a recession rather than during an expansion depends on the size and on the
sign of the shock. The effect on GDP of a small shock, irrespective of the sign, appears
to be larger in absolute value during a typical recession. However, non-linearities kick
in when the size of the budget increase is scaled up, causing a large fiscal stimulus to
yield less effect on GDP during a period of crisis than with a prospering economy. The
results clearly suggest that the classical notion of larger multipliers in a recession needs
to be revised to carefully account for the size and sign of the shock.
Augmented specifications
Next we show our findings when the model specification is changed to include either
private credit or public debt, both normalized by GDP. Figure 3.5 presents linear and
non-linear GDP impulses responses for these extended specifications.
Figure 3.5: Augmented specifications with private credit or public debt, GDP reaction









(a) Linear IRF - Private credit












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Generalised IRF - Private credit













(c) Linear IRF - Public debt












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(d) Generalised IRF - Public debt
Note: Cumulative linear (a, c) and generalised (b, d) impulse responses. Percentage GDP response
to a unit standard deviation (a, c) or to percentages of government expenditure (b, d) fiscal shock.
∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. STVAR
includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and either private credit or public debt. Confidence
bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
The interpretation of the extended specifications, read together with the behaviour
of the extension variables presented in Figure 3.6, is broadly in line with the baseline
key findings. In both the extensions, positive shocks still yield positive GDP effects
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and vice versa. Furthermore, the diminishing return of expansionary stimuli is still in
place. A notable exception is the GDP reaction following a large expenditure increase
in the case in which we check for private credit. This pairs with the behaviour of the
credit-to-GDP ratio itself, which is similar in the case of large shocks, regardless of
their sign. The evidence suggests that the credit mechanism is also responsive to the
size of the shock, and that a large expansionary shock may trigger a negative feedback
on the economy. The debt-to-GDP ratio also appears strongly procyclical, confirming
what we already observed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, it can observed that the reaction
of the debt-to-GDP ratio to a larger shock is proportionally larger than that of GDP
and that the growth in the initial quarters of the response is faster. An interpretation
in line with Perotti (1999) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) is that the outstanding debt stock
increase ends up impairing a further GDP expansion.
Figure 3.6: Augmented specifications, generalised IRFs for the augmentation variables








  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Credit-to-GDP










  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Debt-to-GDP
Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses. Percentage private credit or public debt response to
a fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the
shock. STVAR includes an estimate of combined cycle, government expenditure, tax revenues, GDP,
and either public debt or private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
Scenario analysis, augmented specifications
Figure 3.7 presents the scenario analysis exercise for both the extended specifications.
All the responses are well defined, with the exception of the larger shocks in the typi-
cal expansion scenario for the debt-extended specification, which are reported only in
Appendix C.4.1 for better readability of results. The overall conclusion is consistent
with the findings of Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence presented for the baseline
specification in this chapter in Section 3.3.3.
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Figure 3.7: Augmented specifications, GIRFs for scenario analysis












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Credit, typical expansion












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Credit, typical recession












  G=1%   G=-1%
(c) Debt, typical expansion








  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(d) Debt, typical recession
Note: Cumulative percentage GDP response to a fiscal shock. ∆G denotes the variation in government
expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. The STVAR includes an estimate of combined
cycle, government expenditure, tax revenues, GDP and either private credit (a and b) or public debt
(c and d). Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
Figure 3.8 shows a simple extension to the scenario analysis exercise, limited to
the specification augmented with public debt-to-GDP. We assume that the entirety of
the fiscal shock translates onto debt via deficit, explicitly modelling a budget increase
financed via debt and a debt reduction through a reduction in public expenditures.
The model struggles to narrowly identify the dynamics yielded by fiscal shocks dur-
ing typical expansions, which are reported only in Appendix C.4.1. In any case, a
meaningful comparison can be reached, since the GDP dynamics in typical recessions
fall outside the confidence bands for their typical expansion counterparts. Overall, the
broad conclusion is again that GDP reaction to a fiscal expenditure shock is on average
larger in absolute value during typical recessions.
Figure 3.8: Debt augmented specification, GIRFs for scenario analysis with a shock to
public debt












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a fiscal shock delivered in a median representative
recession. The same shock is applied with opposite signs to government expenditure and public debt.
∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the size of the shock. The
STVAR includes an estimate of combined cycle, government expenditure, tax revenues, public debt,
and GDP. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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3.4 Conclusions and remarks
We estimated a combined economic cycle, a synthetic measure carrying information
on both the real economy and production, and the financial cycle. Such an index
appears well correlated with the official recession chronology published by the NBER
and appears to have inherited the smoothness and the amplitude of movement of the
financial cycle. Its features enable us to investigate the state-contingent response to a
fiscal shock in a complex economy, where the real as well as the financial sectors exert
their own measure of influence. The use of the economic cycle makes even the baseline
specification assume the features of what in Chapter 2 was an extended specification
with measures of financial stress and fiscal burden.
We used a Smooth Transition VAR to allow the economy to fluctuate along the
cycle and analysed the reaction of GDP to shocks of different sign and size. As we
observed with more complete specifications in the previous chapter, asymmetries in
terms of sign and size of the shock do emerge, mostly for larger expansionary shocks.
Such asymmetries are brought to light by the non-linear features of the model and of
the impulse responses, whereas in the same context a linear setting would suppress this
richness of reaction, forcing symmetry in the results.
The baseline specification shows unequivocal concordance between the sign of the
shock and the sign of the response. These dynamics carry over to our extended specifi-
cations and scenario analysis exercises, in concordance with what an extended specifi-
cation would yield when made contingent to a purely financial cycle, as seen in Chapter
2. The most interesting empirical finding remains the phenomenon of limited returns to
increasing expansionary stimuli or, in other words, the persistence of the evidence that
it appears easier to tank an economy rather than to boost it. From a policy perspective,
these results further depart from the notion of expansionary budget cuts á la Alesina
and Ardagna (2013). An analysis of the behaviour of public debt and private credit
after the shock provides further insight, mostly in line with the findings of the previ-
ous chapter. Both private credit and public debt appear to be strongly pro-cyclical,
broadly in line with what has already been established by previous literature on the
relationship between sovereign debt and GDP.
The scenario analysis complements the results yielded by our specifications and
further endorses the hypothesis of a larger multiplier during a recession, tempered by
the diminishing returns of larger expansionary packages. Overall, the results seems
to hint at the existence of an optimally sized measure, able to achieve the optimal
efficiency between cost and result of the intervention.
Overall, our results advocate caution in the context of the traditional countercyclical
public intervention during recessions: the existence of a limiting mechanism to the effect
of expansionary packages may result in a waste of public resources. On the other hand,
the confirmation of the existence of complex dynamics between fiscal space, financial
stress, and the economy as a whole calls for further investigation in this line of research,
in order to unravel the structural interactions of such a complex relationship.
Chapter 4
Cyclical drivers of euro area
consumption: what can we learn
from durable goods?
4.1 Introduction
An extensive body of theoretical and empirical research is devoted to the behaviour
of private consumption, which is the largest component of demand. Yet, relatively
few studies distinguish between durable and nondurable consumption. In particular,
model-based analyses exploring the factors that drive durable goods expenditure in the
euro area, and how they relate to overall consumption, are virtually non-existent at the
time of writing. This is not entirely surprising; aggregate data on euro area durable
consumption expenditure is not yet published officially and only recently became avail-
able for all 19 individual euro area countries. In the present study we focus on this
important component of consumption.
Expenditure on consumer durables – like cars, furniture and electronics – makes
up a small share of total consumption, but accounts for a disproportionately large
fraction of its overall fluctuation. Durable goods feature specific characteristics which
substantially complicate the task of a modeller when they enter into a consumption
function. First, a durable good provides utility over multiple periods and (as with
capital) is subject to depreciation. This allows consumers to postpone purchases of
durables in times of economic hardship, while still benefiting from the service flow
coming from the accumulated stock, and to catch up with upgrades to the desired
stock in times when the economy is doing better. Secondly, durables can often be
financed with credit and at the same time they may serve as collateral to secure the
claim of a lender. This characteristic makes them more exposed to credit conditions
and lending rates. Indeed, using US data, Monacelli (2009), Sterk and Tenreyro (2018),
Cantelmo and Melina (2018) and Di Pace and Hertweck (2019) find that the reaction
of durable expenditure to monetary shocks is larger than that relating to nondurables,
and that in all cases, they co-move. Finally, changes in the stock of durables may be
subject to adjustment costs. This accounts for sluggish adjustments and protracted
cycles in durable expenditure, since the presence of such costs determines “inaction
zones” for which it is optimal for a consumer not to adjust small differences between
the actual and the desired durable stock (see Caballero, 1993).
We start by setting up a theoretical model of durable and nondurable consumption.
The model features non-linear dynamics and occasionally binding liquidity constraints.1
When they bind, consumers are not fully able to smooth consumption and the path of
1The presence of non-linearities is consistent with findings from the literature on durable goods.
For instance, Berger and Vavra (2015) find that durable expenditure reacts more strongly to monetary
shocks during expansions than during recessions.
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durables becomes informative about future expenditure on nondurables. This result,
derived in Chah et al. (1995), represents a deviation from the standard random walk
model of consumption initiated by Hall (1978), and provides a strong justification to
model these two components of consumption separately. Simulations from the the-
oretical model show that shocks to durable preferences and to relative prices induce
important lagged interactions with the path of nondurable consumption.
In a second step, we employ a structural VAR with time-varying parameters (TVP)
and apply it to study durable and nondurable consumption in the US, the euro area
(EA) and the four largest EA countries – Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Our
identification strategy is based on a combination of zero and sign restrictions, and
distinguishes shocks to monetary conditions and aggregate from durable-specific supply
and demand shocks, while accounting for non-linearities.
We find a number of results from our empirical analysis that align well with the pre-
dictions from the theoretical framework. Theory points to spillovers between durable
and nondurable consumption when agents are constrained. Since we work with ag-
gregate data, we exploit the heterogeneity across countries in terms of liquid asset
availability along the income distribution, to check whether in countries where house-
holds are – on average – more likely to be constrained, the spillovers are stronger. Our
empirical findings confirm the theoretical prediction, as we observe a larger magnitude
of the effect on nondurables from both durable-specific demand and supply shocks in
those countries with a larger fraction of constrained households. This complements
the results of Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) on the housing stock (which they treat as
a durable good), the analysis of Li and Martin (2019) regarding the sectoral spillovers
during the Great Recession, and the evidence from Attanasio et al. (2008) on the exis-
tence of binding borrowing constraints in the US car loan market, particularly affecting
the behaviour of low income households.
Following a shock to monetary conditions (defined such that they encompass the
monetary policy and the idiosyncratic country-level credit environment), we find that
the impact on durables is stronger than on nondurable consumption, and reaches its
peak earlier. This evidence agrees with results found in the bulk of literature on US
data (see, among others, Mankiw, 1985; Erceg and Levin, 2006; Forni and Gambetti,
2010; Mallick and Mohsin, 2016; Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016; Miranda-Agrippino and
Ricco, 2018).
Our methodology allows us to aggregate durable and nondurable consumption so
that we can decompose the contribution of structural shocks to total consumption.
This provides ample insights on how demand, supply, and monetary factors interacted
during the recent crisis and subsequent recovery, thus shedding light on cross-country
heterogeneity. Our analysis suggests that monetary condition factors played a key role
during the Great Recession in France, Italy, and Spain, while Germany experienced a
relatively smaller contraction in consumption growth that was driven by supply-side,
durable-specific factors. The crisis in Spain, on the other hand, was further compounded
by durable-specific negative demand shocks.
An even more variegated picture emerges from the second recession, the 2011-2014
sovereign debt crisis, which did not affect Germany, was more diluted over time for
France, and strongly affected Italy and Spain, where durable-specific factors strongly
influenced the deep contraction in consumption, alongside aggregate demand factors.
The heterogeneous evolution of consumption continued up to the post-2014 recovery,
which was mainly animated by durable-specific factors in Italy and Spain. In the last
part of the sample, the slowdown was driven by a combination of factors, rather than
having a specific cause.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 sketches a theoretical
model of consumption with durable and nondurable expenditures and shows their sim-
ulated path under occasionally binding liquidity constraints. Section 4.3 describes the
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data and shows some stylised facts. Section 4.4 discusses our empirical framework,
identification strategy, and results. The heterogeneity of the results for the four biggest
euro area countries is examined in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework draws upon Chah et al. (1995) and José Luengo-Prado
(2006). Facing an income stream {Yt}∞t=0, a consumer maximises the present discounted
value of expected lifetime utility by choosing assets At, nondurable consumption Ct and











At = RAt−1 + Yt − Ct − P ddt




t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞.
The durable good is subject to a rate of depreciation δ and is financiable up to ϕ i.e.
in any given moment, the consumer borrowing limit is a fraction ϕ of the value of the
durable stock and is thus equal to ϕP dDt. Equivalently, one can interpret θ = (1− ϕ)
as a required down payment. The consumer faces a non-negativity constraint on her
assets, which comprise both financial assets At and the portion of the durable good
that is usable as collateral. Durable purchases are denoted by dt.
In this simplified version of the model, we assume that the relative price of durables
P d is constant, as is the real interest rate, which equals the rate of time preference
(ρ = r).2
















Denote Uc(t) and Ud(t) the marginal utilities of nondurable and durable consump-
tion, respectively, in period t. The first order conditions are









− ϕP dµt (4.2)
with supplementary slackness conditions







Substituting for EtUc(t + 1) from Eq. 4.1, Eq. 4.2 becomes (after re-arranging
terms)
2Equivalently, βR = 1 where β = 1/(1 + ρ) is the discount factor and R = 1 + r is the compound
interest.
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Uc(t) =
R








where Ω = r+δ1+r is the user cost of durables.
Assume that the utility function takes the form U(Ct, Dt) = log(Ct) + γlog(Dt).
3
When the liquidity constraint is not binding (µt = 0) from the Euler Equation (Eq.
4.1) it follows that, under perfect foresight, the path of nondurables is smoothed over
time. Eq. 4.5 sets the optimal intratemporal ratio of durables to nondurables, which
in that case is constant. The ratio depends positively on the preference parameter γ,






Under perfect foresight, it is possible that a predicted increase in income makes the
liquidity constraint binding (µt > 0) because, for instance, a low level of financial assets
or insufficient collateral to borrow prevent the agent from smoothing consumption. As
shown by Chah et al. (1995), in this context a temporary departure of durables from
nondurables in anticipation of the change in income, proportional to the shadow price
of the constraint, may carry information about future consumption. This stands in
contrast to the random walk model of Hall (1978), derived under the standard life
cycle-permanent income hypothesis with rational expectations, and thus recovers the
argument of Mankiw (1982).
Figure 4.1 shows simulations under perfect foresight of a known increase in income
occurring in period t = 20 under the assumption that γ = 0.6 in the utility function.
As the predicted variation in income makes the liquidity constraint binding one or more
periods ahead of the time when it occurs, the results illustrate the different reaction of
Ct and Dt for high and low financiability of durables ϕ. As pointed by José Luengo-
Prado (2006), the special case of ϕ = (1 − δ)/R is a useful neutral benchmark. In
that case, the intratemporal allocation between Ct and Dt is not distorted when the
liquidity constraint becomes binding, as in the case when µt = 0. For all other values of
ϕ, a positive shadow price of borrowing triggers adjustments in the relative allocations
of Ct and Dt which are informative for future consumption.
Our result echoes Chah et al. (1995) and stresses the need to model durable con-
sumption in isolation to allow for asynchronous adjustment in the presence of borrowing
constraints. The occasionally binding constraints induce non-linearities that may be
further reinforced by changes in the degree of financiability of durables ϕ over time.
Overall, the results hint that it would be wise to model the relationship between durable
and nondurable consumption in a time-contingent manner.
3This form of the utility function assumes separability of durables and nondurables, which is consis-
tent with empirical findings in the literature (see Bernanke, 1985). The model is in quarterly frequency
and assumes that both the interest rate and the rate of time preference equal 2% in annual terms. The
annual rate of depreciation for durables is calibrated at 15%, a value which stands between the 20%
in Chah et al. (1995) and 8.5% in José Luengo-Prado (2006). The study of Stacchetti and Stolyarov
(2015) on durability and obsolescence reports depreciation rates of 10%, 18%, and 45% for furniture,
automobiles, and computers, respectively.
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Note: For the cases of low, neutral, and high financiability of D (first, second, and third row above),
ϕ takes the values, respectively, 0.85, 0.9554, and 1.0 at quarterly frequency. The D series are rebased
for better visualisation.
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In our next step (described in Appendix D.1) we extend our model to allow for
time variation in relative prices, preferences and the interest rate.4 Simulation results
from shocks to these variables show important lagged interactions from durable to
nondurable consumption. Figure 4.2 illustrates the case of a temporary positive shock
to the preference parameter γ. As the level of persistence increases, the shock triggers
increasingly delayed spillovers onto nondurables Ct for an agent sufficiently close to the
boundary to become liquidity-constrained in response to the shock. For very persistent
shocks, or permanent ones, the constraint does not kick-in and thus the durable-specific
shock has no effect on Ct, just as in the case for the non-liquidity constrained agent.
In all cases, the adjustment of Dt remains very similar.
5
Figure 4.2: Effects from a temporary increase in the preference parameter γ for durables





















Note: The figures display a temporary increase in the preference parameter γ for three cases of different
persistence of the shock, governed by an AR(1) process with autoregressive parameter taking values of
0.1, 0.3, and 0.6.
Appendix D.2 shows a set of additional simulation results under perfect foresight
for a set of shocks to relative prices, preferences, and the interest rate. It is worthwhile
to note that whenever shocks trigger binding borrowing constraints and hence spillovers
onto nondurable consumption, the reaction in Ct never occurs contemporaneously, but
only with a lag. We will use this result in our VAR identification scheme to distinguish
durable-specific from aggregate shocks.
In our framework, occasionally binding constraints – expected to affect only house-
holds with little liquid wealth – in conjunction with the assumption of separability of
durables from nondurables in the utility function, are the key ingredients to generate
lagged spillovers from durable-specific shocks to nondurable consumption. This mech-
anism differs from that presented in Bernanke (1985) where durables and nondurables
are nonseparable in the utility function and furthermore there are adjustment costs. In
4The extended model nests the simple version described above.
5Naturally, this particular result is contingent to the parameterisation used.
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that case, durables and nondurables are either complements or substitutes depending
on the parameterisation, and moreover spillovers, if they occur, are contemporaneous.
Before proceeding, a few caveats are worth mentioning. Admittedly, our approach
provides more limited insights in terms of propagation mechanisms compared to a
fully-fledged general equilibrium framework. Adopting such an alternative framework,
however, would also entail the inclusion of many more assumptions, making it more
difficult to recover a clear inference about the role of occasionally binding constraints.
Hence we believe the parsimonious specification presented here to be optimal for the
purpose at hand. The model is able to represent forward-looking consumer behaviour,
emphasising the distinction between durable and nondurable consumption, while of-
fering a tractable solution in the presence of non-linearities and occasionally binding
constraints.
Secondly, our model does not feature adjustment costs. Their presence, explored for
instance in José Luengo-Prado (2006) and Caballero (1993), adds realism at the cost of
significant complications to modelling. This caveat is of little practical relevance here
since we use the theoretical model to build intuition and expose the channels at play,
before moving on to the empirical analysis. The lack of such costs does not change
the conclusions presented earlier, but is a useful reminder that the magnitude of the
adjustments in durables in response to various shocks – which we have purposefully
abstained from commenting on – are likely to be overstated in the simulation results
shown here.
The adjustments highlighted above occur at the micro level for an individual con-
sumer. At the aggregate level, various agents will be constrained at different moments
in time and subjected to both common and idiosyncratic shocks. This raises a third
caveat, the issue of aggregation and the relevance of the results in a general equilib-
rium setting, discussed for instance in Heaton (1993), Chah et al. (1995), and José
Luengo-Prado (2006).
Here, we limit ourselves to noting that the strength of the spillovers from durable-
specific shocks to nondurable consumption in our setting will depend, among other
things, on the distribution of liquidity-constrained households across the population.
A larger fraction of constrained households will result in stronger spillovers in the ag-
gregate. In this context, results from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey
(HFCS) in Figure 4.3 show that a larger fraction of households in Italy and Spain
appear likely to face liquidity-constrained reactions, rather than in Germany, due to
the lower ratio of liquid assets relative to income in the former two countries.6 While
in Italy and Spain, households up until the third quintile in the income distribution
barely hold financial assets in excess of one quarter worth of income, in Germany this
holds true only for the first quintile in the income distribution. On the basis of this evi-
dence, one might speculate that stronger interactions from durable-specific shocks onto
nondurable consumption can be expected in Italy and Spain, rather than in Germany
at the aggregate level. The results from our empirical model presented in Section 4.5
support this intuition.
6The result is based on one popular measure in the literature for approximating liquidity constraints,
namely the ratio of financial assets (used as a proxy for liquid assets) to income (see Hall, 2011). Based
on self-reported evidence from the HFCS, Le Blanc et al. (2015) similarly find more credit constrained
euro area households in Mediterranean countries (e.g. Italy and Spain) than in Continental countries
(e.g. Germany and France).
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the HFCS 2017 (for EA countries) and on the SCF 2016 (for
the US). The figure shows the ratio of financial assets (FA) to quarterly income (I) among US and EA
households ordered by different quintiles of income. The ratio of FA/I is shown only for the portion in
excess of one quarter worth of income. Due to accounting differences, US and EA data are not directly
comparable.
4.3 Data and stylised facts
In this section we present and discuss the data used to estimate our empirical model.
4.3.1 Data
We use quarterly data from 1996Q1 to 2018Q3 for the biggest four euro area countries
and for the euro area as a whole. Our empirical model uses five variables: real expen-
diture on durables and nondurables (including services), the corresponding deflators of
durables and nondurables, and the nominal consumer lending rate. We compute the
prices for consumption using the implicit deflator from real and nominal series. Since
Eurostat does not publish data for the euro area as a whole, we sum up the series
for consumption of all the 19 eurozone member states and then proceed to compute
the prices for the countries. We also include US data over the same sample period for
comparison. Further details about the data can be found in Appendix D.3.
4.3.2 Stylised facts
In our empirical application, we use real expenditure on nondurable consumption and
the corresponding price deflator as proxies for the whole economy, in lieu of GDP and
consumer price inflation. The main reason for this choice is to be able to show results
for total consumption, aggregating durables and nondurables. We believe we are not
losing generality with this choice: as Figure 4.4 shows, the annual growth rates of
nondurable consumption and GDP are highly correlated.7
7As we shall see later, when we estimate our empirical model using GDP excluding durables instead
of nondurable consumption as a robustness check, the results remain qualitatively comparable.
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Figure 4.4: Cyclicalities of GDP, durables, and nondurables



































































Note: Annual growth rate of GDP, durables, and nondurables with shaded recessions, sample from
1997Q1 to 2018Q3. Recession dating based on NBER (for the US), CEPR (for EA), and ECRI (for
DE, FR, IT, and ES).
One feature evident in Figure 4.4 is the volatility of durables compared to GDP.
In particular, expenditure on durables tends to grow faster during periods of economic
expansion, and to contract more sharply during recessions. Table 4.1 provides a break-
down of consumption components in terms of GDP shares and shares of GDP variance
explained. Durable expenditure accounts for a more than proportional fraction of the
variance of GDP, further justifying the principle of treating durables as a separate
variable in the model.8
Table 4.1: Cyclical properties of consumption and its components
US EA DE FR IT ES
%Y %σ2 %Y %σ2 %Y %σ2 %Y %σ2 %Y %σ2 %Y %σ2
Consumption 67.4 54.7 55.4 33.7 52.6 9.7 53.2 34.0 60.8 43.9 59.6 62.6
Dur 7.8 13.1 5.2 5.1 6.1 -2.6 4.8 5.8 5.2 8.8 4.3 9.0
Cars 36.2 5.3 42.2 1.4 42.2 -5.2 42.4 3.1 37.8 2.6 48.1 4.9
Semi-Dur - - 4.5 4.9 5.1 3.7 4.6 5.0 6.0 8.5 5.6 7.2
Non-Dur 14.9 13.1 14.5 6.5 14.6 0.9 16.2 5.4 19.7 13.0 18.2 16.5
Services 44.7 25.4 24.8 13.2 26.9 7.7 27.6 16.0 29.9 12.7 31.5 29.3
Note: Shares of GDP and percentage of GDP variance explained by consumption and its components
in the period 1997Q1 to 2018Q3. Cars are reported as a percentage of durables.
Figure 4.5 presents relative consumption growth and relative price inflation of
durables, together with the evolution of real disposable income. Over the long-run,
we can observe a downward trend in relative prices, which causes upward pressure on
relative consumption growth; this is equivalent to a rising share of durable expendi-
ture in total consumption. However, this phenomenon appears absent during weak
phases of the business cycle, when a decline in disposable income also drives down
relative consumption, as observed in Italy and Spain during 2008-2012. At the same
8The only exception, Germany, provides a different kind of justification of our modelling choice as
it exhibits a peculiar stabilizing effect.
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time, expansions of the business cycle are also associated with catching-up effects of
relative consumption. This intuition is confirmed by the analysis of Dossche and Saiz
(2018), who found evidence of increasing age in the stock of durables in countries heav-
ily affected by the financial crisis, giving rise to pent-up demand as soon as economic
conditions improved.
Figure 4.5: Relative consumption, relative prices, and disposable income































Note: Average growth of relative consumption, prices, and disposable income for the periods 2000Q1-
2018Q3, 2008Q1-2012Q4, 2013Q1-2018Q3.
4.4 Empirical analysis
In this section we describe our model, belonging to the family of structural VARs with
time-contingent parameters, and our identification strategy, based on a mix of sign and
zero restrictions.
The adoption of a time-varying parameter specification in the empirical framework
is supported by our theoretical setup featuring occasionally binding constraints, as
presented in Section 4.2. To complement the intuition from the theoretical model,
we use two parameter stability tests: a Chow test and a Nyblom-Hansen test. Both
test the null hypothesis of parameter stability against the alternative of, respectively,
parameters changing at a specified break point, or parameters following a random walk
evolution. To overcome possible small sample distortions, as Candelon and Lütkepohl
(2001) point out, we also adopt the bootstrap approach of the Chow test, both in the
sample split and in the break point versions, as documented in Lütkepohl and Krätzig
(2004). Test results provided in Appendix D.5.2 generally reject the null hypothesis of
parameter stability and support the use of a time-varying parameter model.
4.4.1 The model
We specify a structural vector autoregressive model with time varying parameters
(TVP-SVAR) identified by a set of sign and zero restrictions. We name y the vec-
tor of endogenous variables, such that y =
[
D,P d, C, P,R
]′
, where D denotes real
expenditure on durables, P d is the price of durables, C refers to nondurable consump-
tion in real terms and P is the implicit deflator for nondurable consumption. R stands
for the nominal interest rate on consumer credit. All variables are in year-on-year
growth rates with the exception of the interest rate, which is in year-on-year changes.
We choose to use one lag due to the series length. The choice is broadly consistent
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with formal model selection criteria as reported in Appendix D.5.1, in particular the
Schwarz Bayesian criterion, while the Akaike criterion favours a somewhat longer lag
structure. A common choice in the TVP-SVAR literature is to limit the amount of
lags to two, due to the computation intensity of the model9 (e.g. in Primiceri, 2005;
Cogley and Sargent, 2005; Gaĺı and Gambetti, 2009; D’Agostino et al., 2013; Koop and
Korobilis, 2013; Canova and Pérez Forero, 2015; Lubik and Matthes, 2015; Legrand,
2018). We perform the estimation via the BEAR toolbox, as described in Dieppe et al.
(2016), using Bayesian techniques, as described in Appendix D.6.
The baseline model can then be written as in Equation 4.6:
A0Xt = Ai,t(L)Xt−1 + εt (4.6)
A0 is the matrix of contemporaneous relations and Ai,t(L) represents the lag-




0 εt, εt ∼ N (0,Σt) (4.7)
We allow both the matrix of coefficients and the structural innovation variance-
covariance matrix to be time contingent. In a more compact form the model becomes
Xt = βtXt−1 + ηt (4.8)
where
Xt−1 = In ⊗ (L)Xt−1 (4.9)
and







We let the coefficient matrix β evolve according to a random walk process with an
endogenously determined variance-covariance matrix Ω:
βt = βt−1 + νt, νt ∼ N (0,Ω) (4.11)
To address the stochastic volatility introduced by the time contingency of the struc-
tural variance matrix Σt we adopt the approach of Cogley and Sargent (2005), who
generalise to the multivariate case the stochastic volatility model of Jacquier et al.




where Z is lower triangular and orthogonalizes the structural innovations εt without
being an identification scheme. The matrix Ht is diagonal:
Ht =
λ1h1t 0 00 λ2h2t 0
0 0 λ3h3t
 , Z =
 1 0 0ζ21 1 0
ζ31 ζ32 1
 (4.13)
We denote known scaling terms with λi. As in Cogley and Sargent (2005), the
diagonal elements of Ht are assumed to be independent, univariate stochastic volatilities
evolving as driftless geometric random walks:
lnhit = lnhit−1 + υit, υit ∼ N (0,Φi) (4.14)
9We also estimated the model with 2 lags, finding qualitatively comparable results, albeit affected
by the increased dimensionality.
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This formulation implies that the growth rate of the stochastic volatility is normally
distributed around zero. Generalizing the notation and implicitly allowing for a drift
in the growth rate, we can then rewrite
Ht =
λ1 exp(h1t) 0 00 λ2 exp(h2t) 0
0 0 λ3 exp(h3t)
 (4.15)
where the scaled diagonal elements are approximately log-normally distributed and
grow according to an AR(1) process with standard independent innovations:
hit = γhit−1 + υit, υit ∼ N (0,Φi) (4.16)
4.4.2 Identification strategy
We use a combination of sign and zero restrictions à la Arias et al. (2018), as reported
in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Sign restrictions
Var\Shock Durable Demand Durable Supply Aggregate Demand Aggregate Supply Monetary
D + + +
PD + −
C 0 0 + + +
P 0 0 + − +
R + −
Our modelling strategy rests on two main choices: to model durables and non-
durables separately, and to use nondurables as a proxy for GDP. We include in the
model both durable and nondurable consumption expenditures so that we are able to
aggregate them to total consumption.
Given our approach, we identify two fairly standard aggregate demand and supply
shocks. In the former, a positive demand shock pushes up both quantity and prices,
as well as the nominal interest rate. In the latter, a positive supply shock is associated
with a fall in prices and a rise in quantities. With the same logic we add durable-specific
shocks, identified with the help of a corresponding zero restriction on both the quantity
and the price of nondurables. Our choice of zero restrictions is supported by the
theoretical model presented in Section 4.2, showing that spillovers from D to C, when
present, occur only with a lag. Furthermore, it is possible to find real-world examples
of such shocks: Appendix D.4 provides an example from the home appliances market
in the US. The monetary condition shock follows a standard textbook identification
and, given that we use the lending rate, it captures both monetary policy shocks and
country-idiosyncratic broader credit supply conditions.
4.4.3 Results
In what follows we present a selection of results. Impulse response functions displayed
in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 represent the expected response of the model to the identified
structural shocks and are therefore computed using the long-term, homoskedastic value
for the variance-covariance matrix Σt. The model is estimated in annual growth rates,
over the period from 1997Q1 to 2018Q3. Euro area series are a bottom-up aggregation
of country-level data for the 19 individual member states.
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Figure 4.6: Euro area: impulse responses












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock computed using the long-run,
homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68% credibility bands.
Figure 4.7: United States: impulse responses












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock computed using the long-run,
homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68% credibility bands.
In Appendix D.7.2 we also show a version of the IRFs computed using the time-
varying variance-covariance matrix Σt.
From a first comparison of Figures 4.6 and 4.7, some regularities are visible between
the euro area and the US. The reaction of durables to a monetary condition shock is
larger than that of nondurable consumption, confirming the common wisdom in the
literature (as found in Monacelli, 2009; Cantelmo and Melina, 2018; Sterk and Tenreyro,
2018; Di Pace and Hertweck, 2019). However, this result looks heavily influenced by
the assumption of homoskedasticity: once relaxed, the difference in the magnitude of
reactions wanes. At the same time, some differences arise: it is easy to spot that in
the US case durable and nondurable consumption expenditures co-move regardless of
the nature of the shock. On the other hand, in the euro area we observe either co-
movement or substitution depending on the nature of the shock: demand-side shocks
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trigger substitution, while supply-side shocks imply co-movement.
Comparing the magnitudes of impulse response functions for different countries calls
for caution, as they also reflect differences in the size of the structural shocks. However,
if we look at the evolution of the impulse response functions over time, the response of
nondurable prices to a durable-specific supply shock appears to be weaker in the post
crisis period for both the US and the euro area. As shown in Figure 4.8, the effect of
the shock reaches its peak faster in the US around the fourth quarter after the impact,
while lagging behind in the euro area. It is easy to see that the peak reaction is at its
highest close to the crisis period, and then settles down at lower values in the post-crisis
period.







































Note: Response of the price of nondurables to a positive durables-specific supply shock for (a) euro
area and (b) United States.
We can uncover similar insights by looking at the effect on the price of nondurables
following a durable-specific demand shock: the peak effect comes slightly faster in the
US, around the second and third quarter after the impact, and the largest effect occurs
during the crisis period, as shown in Figure 4.9.

















































Note: Response of the price of nondurables to a positive durables-specific demand shock for (a) euro
area and (b) United States.
Interestingly, the effect of a durable-specific demand shock on nondurable consump-
tion for the euro area and the US is of opposite sign, clearly showing substitution in the
former case and co-movement in the latter case. The reaction peaks faster in the US
during the crisis with a declining magnitude of the effect stabilising over the post-crisis
period. A similar dynamic can be retrieved for the euro area, as shown in Figure 4.10,
even if with negative sign. Mirroring a weakened co-movement in the US, the empirical
evidence shows a strengthened substitution effect in the euro area.
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Note: Response of nondurables to a positive durables-specific demand shock for the (a) euro area and
(b) United States.
The historical decomposition of the annual growth of total consumption sheds fur-
ther light on the crisis dynamics in Europe as well as in the US. As Figure 4.11 shows,
the 2008-09 crisis was strongly driven by both supply and demand in the US, while
the main contributor to the first crisis in the euro area was the demand side, together
with unfavourable monetary conditions, with a strong negative contribution from sup-
ply hindering the recovery after the crisis. In both cases, the recovery that began in
2014 appears to be boosted by supply factors, with the most recent differences due to
the dissipation of such positive effects which, in the euro area, was compounded by a
weakening of both durable-specific and, later on, aggregate demand.
Figure 4.11: Total consumption: historical decomposition











Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
(a) Euro area








Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
(b) United States
Note: Historical decomposition of the year-on-year total consumption growth. Total consumption is
an aggregate of durable and nondurable consumption. Data for (a) euro area and (b) United States.
In Appendix D.8, we present results for a SVAR with constant parameters estimated
in levels and in y-o-y differences, a TVP-SVAR as in the baseline specification but using
GDP excluding durable instead of nondurable consumption, and adding housing to the
list of durables, as a sensitivity check. The results are broadly comparable in qualitative
terms.10
4.5 Heterogeneity among countries
The theoretical model predicts spillovers between durables and nondurables when
agents suffer from liquidity constraints. As discussed in Section 4.2, at the aggre-
gate level agents will become constrained at different moments in time, blurring the
general picture due to aggregation effects. However, in Figure 4.3 we showed impor-
tant differences across countries in the likelihood of households becoming affected by
10Specifically, as the housing variables we use residential investment for the US and investment in
dwellings for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.
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liquidity constraints, and therefore in the likelihood of observing stronger effects at the
aggregate level.
The predictions of the theoretical model are confirmed by the empirical evidence
recovered from the TVP-VAR, as shown in Figure 4.12. More constrained countries, like
Italy and Spain, exhibit larger (in absolute size) spillover effects, particularly during the
crisis period. Moreover, data suggests that the sign of the spillover has a relationship
with the income distribution, with less constrained countries showing a substitution
effect. We show the distribution of maxima for each quarter in Appendix D.7.5.













































Demand: 1997-2018 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2018 Supply: 1997-2018 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2018
Note: The bars represent peak effects of durable-specific demand and supply shocks on nondurable
consumption, disaggregated by pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis sub-samples. Magnitudes have been
rescaled to be comparable across countries and are reported on the left scale. On the right scale, in
reverse order, the black squares show a measure of financial constraints of households. The measure
represents financial assets held in excess of quarterly income and is computed from HFCS data, as in
Figure 4.3, averaged for the third and fourth quintiles of the income distribution for EA countries and
the euro area aggregate.
As expected, the historical decomposition of the annual growth in total consumption
exhibits heterogeneity at the level of euro area member states. Focusing on crisis and
post-crisis periods, Figure 4.13 shows how the four largest economies of the euro area
differ both in the size of consumption contractions and in the drivers behind them.
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Figure 4.13: Total consumption: historical decomposition
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(a) Germany
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(b) France
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(c) Italy











Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
(d) Spain
Note: Historical decomposition of the year-on-year total consumption growth. Total consumption is
an aggregate of durable and nondurable consumption.
The Great Recession of 2008-09 and the sovereign debt crisis that followed is specifi-
cally evident in France, Italy, and Spain and much less pronounced in Germany. More-
over, Figure (a) shows how the relatively small contraction in consumption growth
is due to supply side factors, specifically of durables. This contribution can also be
found in France and Italy, while in Spain the demand side, both durable-specific and
aggregate, appears to be among the main drivers. Figures (b), (c) and (d) also sug-
gest that monetary conditions (which captures both common monetary policy and the
country-idiosyncratic consumer credit environment) play a key role depicting a picture
of economic contraction also on the financial side during the Great Recession, but much
less so in the sovereign debt crisis.
The sovereign debt crisis – a second recession between the years 2011 and 2014
– does not affect Germany, but it is even worse than the first recession in Italy and
Spain, and more contained in France. In Italy and Spain durable-specific factors seem
to play a strong role in the second recession, as well as in the subsequent recovery.
The consumption slowdown in the last part of the sample (up to the third quarter
of 2018) appears to be driven by a combination of demand- and supply-side factors,
including the waning support from durable-specific demand contributions in Italy and
Spain. The monetary conditions contribution appears limited.
4.6 Concluding remarks
We used a theoretical partial equilibrium model to inform a structural TVP-SVAR
where the structural shocks were identified with a mixture of sign and zero restrictions.
One interesting prediction from the theoretical model is that liquidity constrained
agents will experience spillovers from durable-specific shocks to nondurable consump-
tion. Notwithstanding the consideration that the aggregation of agents to country-level
data would reasonably weaken such effects due to different households being constrained
at different moments in time, our empirical evidence still suggests that countries with
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a larger share of liquidity-constrained households show larger spillover magnitudes.
Countries with less constrained households even exhibit substitution effects, albeit small
and not significant, rather than positive (co-movement) effects.
Moreover, we are able to confirm for the euro area and the largest four euro area
countries that durable expenditure reacts more strongly and faster in response to a
shock to monetary conditions, a standard result commonly reported in the literature
on US consumption. An analysis of the role played by different factors during the
recent crisis highlights a significant degree of cross-country heterogeneity.
Conclusion
We focused on how a non-linear empirical framework can improve our understanding
of economic phenomena, specifically looking at expenditure fiscal multipliers in the US
and consumption dynamics in the euro area.
We established an overarching conclusion regarding the merits of non-linear mod-
elling in any empirical investigation of sufficiently complex economic phenomena. At
the same time, we produced some interesting findings in relation to our objects of in-
quiry, namely fiscal multipliers and consumption dynamics. After a careful analysis of
the STVAR model, we set the economy free to fluctuate around a cycle carrying infor-
mation about the financial environment to study how a government expenditure fiscal
shock can impact the economy, using both a parsimonious baseline specification and
an extended choice of variables to control for a measure of fiscal burden. We expanded
our approach, designing and estimating a richer cycle, which could carry information
about both the financial environment and the real side of the economy, so as to model
a comprehensive economic cycle including the features of both the business and the
financial cycle. We confirmed that an economy contingent on the economic cycle keeps
some features induced by both the cycles, and even extending a baseline parsimonious
specification does not change its key properties. Some overall crucial findings can be
adduced among the abundant results yielded by our empirical investigations.
First, the Great Recession acts as a game changer in models considering the business
cycle, as the inclusion of the 2009-2011 crisis in the sample is able to reverse the sign of
the effect of a fiscal shock yielded by the model. Second, it appears that there exists a
phenomenon of diminishing returns to larger expansionary fiscal shocks. Furthermore,
this result appears consistent across specifications, and across recession, as well as
expansion, scenarios. We regard both these findings as crucial from a policy perspective.
They advocate for extreme caution in delivering large expansionary stimuli during peri-
crisis periods, where the two mechanics may merge. On top of that, all our empirical
evidence consistently suggests that it is easier to plunge an economy into recession
than to boost it, making the cost of a mistaken policy dangerously steep. The third
outcome, also fairly robust across specifications, arises from our scenario experiment,
in which we observe that the size of the GDP response to a shock is, in absolute
value, usually larger during a typical recession, rather than a typical expansion. The
narrative of larger slack in the economy during crisis periods, and therefore of a larger
response to expansionary fiscal stimuli, is in line with most of the classic literature on
fiscal multipliers, regardless of the econometric specification they use. A possible future
expansion of our research would be to build on our empirical investigation and match
the response of our atheoretical model with those of a more complete – still non-linear
– structural model which, at the price of some limiting assumptions, could expand our
general understanding of how fiscal policy is received.
While exploring the dynamics of consumption in the euro area, one interesting pre-
diction from the theoretical model is that liquidity-constrained agents will experience
spillovers from durable-specific shocks to nondurable consumption. Notwithstanding
that the aggregation of agents to country-level data would reasonably weaken such ef-
fects due to different households being constrained at different moments in time, our em-
pirical evidence still suggests that countries with a larger share of liquidity-constrained
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households show larger spillover magnitudes. Countries with less constrained house-
holds even exhibit substitution effects, albeit small and not significant, rather than
positive (co-movement) effects. Moreover, we are able to confirm for the euro area
and the largest four euro area countries that durable expenditure reacts more strongly
and faster in response to a shock to monetary conditions, a standard result commonly
reported in the literature on US consumption. An analysis on the role played by dif-
ferent factors during the recent crisis highlights a significant degree of cross-country
heterogeneity. A natural extension of this line of investigation would be the adop-
tion of a full-scale general equilibrium model, able to deepen our understanding of the
consumption dynamics in a broader economic framework.
Overall, we believe that a non-linear approach yields richer, more complete, and
ultimately more informative results. A linearised approach to economic phenomena,
albeit usefully simple, too often occludes important dynamics and interactions. Such
a statement, too large to present itself as a research agenda, rather aims to be an
underlying key tenet, in accordance with Greenspan’s inspiring principle that “An
assumption of linearity may be adequate for estimating average relationships, but few
expect that an economy will respond linearly to every aberration”.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Estimation procedure
The STVAR model is defined as
Xt = [(1− F (zt−1))ΠE + F (zt−1)ΠR] (L)Xt−1 + ut (A.1)
ut ∼ N(0,Ωt) (A.2)




γ > 0 (A.4)
Var(z) = 1 E[z] = 0, (A.5)
where X is the data matrix, ΠE and ΠC are the coefficient matrices; z is the
switching variable, ruling the transition on the cycle, and computed as the 7-quarters
moving average of the GDP growth; and 0 ≤ F ≤ 1 is the smoothing function. The
subscripts E and R refer respectively to expansion and recession phases of the business
cycle.
The model log-likelihood is given by













ut = Xt − (1− F (zt−1))ΠE(L)Xt−1 − F (zt−1)ΠR(L)Xt−1 (A.7)
and a is a constant.
The model has many parameters Ψ = {γ, ΩE , ΩR, ΠE , ΠR} and, as it appears
from Equation A.6, becomes linear in the lag polynomials {ΠE , ΠR} for any guess
of {γ, ΩE , ΩR}. The lag polynomials can be estimated with weighted least squares,








We set Π = [ΠE ,ΠR] and then build an extended vector of regressors
Wt = [(1− F (zt−1))Xt−1, F (zt−1)Xt−1 . . . (1− F (zt−1))Xt−p, F (zt−1)Xt−p] (A.9)
so that we can rewrite Equation A.7 in a more compact form, ut = Xt − ΠW′t.
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t ) = 0 (A.11)


































































Equation A.15 enables us to obtain, given any guess of {γ, ΩE , ΩR}, the associated
Π, and thus the likelihood: it will be sufficient to iterate over the guesses to find the
global maximum. Since the problem presents itself as highly non-linear, use the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method developed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003),
implemented with the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. The procedure consists
in building a chain Ψ = {Chol (ΩC) , Chol (ΩE)} of drawings converging to the true
distribution of parameters. We leave out γ, which is calibrated, and draw the Cholesky
decomposition of the covariance matrices to ensure that ΩE and ΩR are always positive
definite.
The MH algorithm is initialised with a Ψ0 entry, which is estimated from a linearised
version of the model. A new candidate member Θ will be generated as Θ = Ψ0 + ψ,
with ψ i.i.d. ∼ N (0,Σψ). Θ is accepted and becomes Ψ1 if it improves the convergence









Σψ is adjusted on the fly to target an acceptance rate of around 30%. We perform
200.000 iterations and discard the first half as burn-in period.
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A.2 Additional figures for original sample
The original AG sample goes from 1947Q1 to 2008Q4. We estimate it in both levels
and first differences showing the consequence of the inclusion of foreign variables (lags
of the indicator variable) in the model design matrix.
A.2.1 Estimation in levels
Figure A.1: Effect of foreign variables (FX), linear IRFs












(a) With FX - Contraction












(b) With FX - Expansion












(c) Without FX - Contraction












(d) Without FX - Expansion
Note: Cumulative GDP response to a unit standard deviation of government expenditure for a model
with (a, b) and without (c, d) augmentation of the design matrix W. STVAR(x) includes (log real)
government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
The estimation is performed in levels.
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Figure A.2: Generalised IRFs with FX, shocks are percentages of government expen-
diture
















































Note: Cumulative percentage GDP response to a percentage of fiscal shock with confidence bands
at 5th and 95th percentile. STVARx includes government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP. The
estimation design matrix is augmented with lags of GDP growth. The estimation is performed in levels.
Figure A.3: Generalised IRFs with no FX, shocks are percentages of government ex-
penditure
















































Note: Cumulative percentage GDP response to a percentage of fiscal shock with confidence bands at
5th and 95th percentile. STVAR includes government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP.
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A.2.2 Estimation in first differences
Figure A.4: Linear IRFs


























Note: Cumulative linear impulse responses to a unit standard deviation with confidence bands at 5th
and 95th percentile. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP.
Figure A.5: Generalised IRFs, shocks are percentages of government expenditure
















































Note: Cumulative percentage GDP response to a percentage of fiscal shock with confidence bands at
5th and 95th percentile. STVAR includes government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP.
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A.3 Additional figures for the longer sample
We extend our sample (starting from 1947Q1) to 2019Q4. We deliberately exclude the
most recent 2020-21 recession as it was caused by exogenous policy measures following
a global pandemic, rather than by an endogenous development within economy.
Figure A.6: Linear IRFs, estimation in differences


























Note: Cumulative linear impulse responses to a unit standard deviation with confidence bands at 5th
and 95th percentile. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP.
Figure A.7: Generalised IRFs, shocks are percentages of government expenditure












































Note: Cumulative percentage GDP response to a percentage of fiscal shock with confidence bands at
5th and 95th percentile. STVAR includes government expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional figures for baseline specification
Our baseline specification includes (log real) government expenditure, tax revenues,
GDP, and private credit. The main sample goes from 1947Q1 to 2019Q4, while the
shorter sample used for comparison stops at 2008Q4.
Figure B.1: Longer sample, linear and generalised IRFs, GDP response






























































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a, b) or to a percentage of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax
revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure B.2: Longer sample, linear and generalised IRFs, credit-to-GDP response






































































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage private credit response to
a unit standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure,
tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure B.3: Shorter sample, linear and generalised IRFs, GDP response






























































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax
revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure B.4: Shorter sample, linear and generalised IRFs, credit-to-GDP response






























































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage private credit response to
a unit standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure,
tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
B.1.1 Scenario analysis
Figure B.5: Scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical scenarios








































































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock delivered in a median representative re-
cession or expansion. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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B.2 Additional figures for augmented specification
Our augmented specification includes (log real) government expenditure, tax revenues,
public debt, GDP, and private credit.
Figure B.6: Linear and generalised IRFs, GDP response


































































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax
revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure B.7: Linear and generalised IRFs, credit-to-GDP response






























































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage private credit response to
a unit standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure,
tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure B.8: Linear and generalised IRFs, debt-to-GDP response














































































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage public debt response to
a unit standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure,
tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
B.2.1 Scenario analysis
Figure B.9: Scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical scenarios
































































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock triggered in a median recession/expansion
history. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure B.10: Scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical scenarios with a shock to public debt




























































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock triggered in a median representative re-
cession or expansion. The same shock is applied with opposite signs to government expenditure and
public debt. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
B.3 Alternative scenario analysis
This section presents the results of the scenario analysis where the typical recession and
expansion histories are built using as a criterion the value of the transition F function.
When F < 0.2 we consider the cycle to be in an extreme expansion and, vice versa,
when F > 0.8 we regard the cycle as to be in an extreme contraction.
Figure B.11: Baseline and debt-augmented specifications, alternative scenario analysis












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(a) Expansion - Baseline












  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(b) Recession - Baseline








  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(c) Expansion - Augmented








  G=1%   G=-1%   G=5%   G=-5%
(d) Recession - Augmented
Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a fiscal shock delivered in a median representative
recession or expansion. ∆G denotes the variation in government expenditure, the percentage is the
size of the shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, (public debt, in the extended
specification) GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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C.1 List of variables
We remained faithful to the original naming system used by McCracken and Ng (2016)
and detailed in the appendix of their paper. The column tcode denotes the follow-
ing data transformations for a series x: (1) no transformation; (2) ∆xt; (3) ∆
2xt; (4)
log(xt); (5) ∆ log(xt); (6) ∆





. The FRED column gives mnemon-
ics in FRED followed by a short description. The comparable series in Global Insight,
from which the data are taken, is given in the column GSI.
Table C.1: Group 1: output and income
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 1 5 RPI Real Personal Income M 14386177 PI
2 2 5 W875RX1 Real personal income ex transfer receipts M 145256755 PI less transfers
3 6 5 INDPRO IP Index M 116460980 IP: total
4 7 5 IPFPNSS IP: Final Products and Nonindustrial Supplies M 116460981 IP: products
5 8 5 IPFINAL IP: Final Products (Market Group) M 116461268 IP: final prod
6 9 5 IPCONGD IP: Consumer Goods M 116460982 IP: cons gds
7 10 5 IPDCONGD IP: Durable Consumer Goods M 116460983 IP: cons dble
8 11 5 IPNCONGD IP: Nondurable Consumer Goods M 116460988 IP: cons nondble
9 12 5 IPBUSEQ IP: Business Equipment M 116460995 IP: bus eqpt
10 13 5 IPMAT IP: Materials M 116461002 IP: matls
11 14 5 IPDMAT IP: Durable Materials M 116461004 IP: dble matls
12 15 5 IPNMAT IP: Nondurable Materials M 116461008 IP: nondble matls
13 16 5 IPMANSICS IP: Manufacturing (SIC) M 116461013 IP: mfg
14 17 5 IPB51222s IP: Residential Utilities M 116461276 IP: res util
15 18 5 IPFUELS IP: Fuels M 116461275 IP: fuels
16 19 1 NAPMPI ISM Manufacturing: Production Index M 110157212 NAPM prodn
17 20 2 CUMFNS Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing M 116461602 Cap util
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Table C.2: Group 2: labour market
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 21* 2 HWI Help-Wanted Index for United States Help wanted indx
2 22* 2 HWIURATIO Ratio of Help Wanted/No. Unemployed M 110156531 Help wanted/unemp
3 23 5 CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force M 110156467 Emp CPS total
4 24 5 CE16OV Civilian Employment M 110156498 Emp CPS nonag
5 25 2 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate M 110156541 U: all
6 26 2 UEMPMEAN Average Duration of Unemployment (Weeks) M 110156528 U: mean duration
7 27 5 UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks M 110156527 U <5 wks
8 28 5 UEMP5TO14 Civilians Unemployed for 5–14 Weeks M 110156523 U 5-14 wks
9 29 5 UEMP15OV Civilians Unemployed - 15 Weeks & Over M 110156524 U 15+ wks
10 30 5 UEMP15T26 Civilians Unemployed for 15–26 Weeks M 110156525 U 15-26 wks
11 31 5 UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over M 110156526 U 27+ wks
12 32* 5 CLAIMSx Initial Claims M 15186204 UI claims
13 33 5 PAYEMS All Employees: Total nonfarm M 123109146 Emp: total
14 34 5 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries M 123109172 Emp: gds prod
15 35 5 CES1021000001 All Employees: Mining and Logging: Mining M 123109244 Emp: mining
16 36 5 USCONS All Employees: Construction M 123109331 Emp: const
17 37 5 MANEMP All Employees: Manufacturing M 123109542 Emp: mfg
18 38 5 DMANEMP All Employees: Durable goods M 123109573 Emp: dble gds
19 39 5 NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable goods M 123110741 Emp: nondbles
20 40 5 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries M 123109193 Emp: services
21 41 5 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation & Utilities M 123111543 Emp: TTU
22 42 5 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade M 123111563 Emp: wholesale
23 43 5 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade M 123111867 Emp: retail
24 44 5 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities M 123112777 Emp: FIRE
25 45 5 USGOVT All Employees: Government M 123114411 Emp: Govt
26 46 1 CES0600000007 Avg Weekly Hours: Goods-Producing M 140687274 Avg hrs
27 47 2 AWOTMAN Avg Weekly Overtime Hours: Manufacturing M 123109554 Overtime: mfg
28 48 1 AWHMAN Avg Weekly Hours: Manufacturing M 14386098 Avg hrs: mfg
29 49 1 NAPMEI ISM Manufacturing: Employment Index M 110157206 NAPM empl
30 127 6 CES0600000008 Avg Hourly Earnings: Goods-Producing M 123109182 AHE: goods
31 128 6 CES2000000008 Avg Hourly Earnings: Construction M 123109341 AHE: const
32 129 6 CES3000000008 Avg Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing M 123109552 AHE: mfg
Table C.3: Group 3: housing
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 50 4 HOUST Housing Starts: Total New Privately Owned M 110155536 Starts: nonfarm
2 51 4 HOUSTNE Housing Starts, Northeast M 110155538 Starts: NE
3 52 4 HOUSTMW Housing Starts, Midwest M 110155537 Starts: MW
4 53 4 HOUSTS Housing Starts, South M 110155543 Starts: South
5 54 4 HOUSTW Housing Starts, West M 110155544 Starts: West
6 55 4 PERMIT New Private Housing Permits (SAAR) M 110155532 BP: total
7 56 4 PERMITNE New Private Housing Permits, Northeast (SAAR) M 110155531 BP: NE
8 57 4 PERMITMW New Private Housing Permits, Midwest (SAAR) M 110155530 BP: MW
9 58 4 PERMITS New Private Housing Permits, South (SAAR) M 110155533 BP: South
10 59 4 PERMITW New Private Housing Permits, West (SAAR) M 110155534 BP: West
Table C.4: Group 4: consumption, orders, and inventories
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 3 5 DPCERA3M086SBEA Real personal consumption expenditures M 123008274 Real Consumption
2 4* 5 CMRMTSPLx Real Manu. and Trade Industries Sales M 110156998 M&T sales
3 5* 5 RETAILx Retail and Food Services Sales M 130439509 Retail sales
4 60 1 NAPM ISM: PMI Composite Index M 110157208 PMI
5 61 1 NAPMNOI ISM: New Orders Index M 110157210 NAPM new ordrs
6 62 1 NAPMSDI ISM: Supplier Deliveries Index M 110157205 NAPM vendor del
7 63 1 NAPMII ISM: Inventories Index M 110157211 NAPM Invent
8 64 5 ACOGNO New Orders for Consumer Goods M 14385863 Orders: cons gds
9 65* 5 AMDMNOx New Orders for Durable Goods M 14386110 Orders: dble gds
10 66* 5 ANDENOx New Orders for Nondefense Capital Goods M 178554409 Orders: cap gds
11 67* 5 AMDMUOx Unfilled Orders for Durable Goods M 14385946 Unf orders: dble
12 68* 5 BUSINVx Total Business Inventories M 15192014 M&T invent
13 69* 2 ISRATIOx Total Business: Inventories to Sales Ratio M 15191529 M&T invent/sales
14 130* 2 UMCSENTx Consumer Sentiment Index hhsntn Consumer expect
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Table C.5: Group 5: money and credit
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 3 5 DPCERA3M086SBEA Real personal consumption expenditures M 123008274 Real Consumption
2 4* 5 CMRMTSPLx Real Manu. and Trade Industries Sales M 110156998 M&T sales
3 5* 5 RETAILx Retail and Food Services Sales M 130439509 Retail sales
4 60 1 NAPM ISM: PMI Composite Index M 110157208 PMI
5 61 1 NAPMNOI ISM: New Orders Index M 110157210 NAPM new ordrs
6 62 1 NAPMSDI ISM: Supplier Deliveries Index M 110157205 NAPM vendor del
7 63 1 NAPMII ISM: Inventories Index M 110157211 NAPM Invent
8 64 5 ACOGNO New Orders for Consumer Goods M 14385863 Orders: cons gds
9 65* 5 AMDMNOx New Orders for Durable Goods M 14386110 Orders: dble gds
10 66* 5 ANDENOx New Orders for Nondefense Capital Goods M 178554409 Orders: cap gds
11 67* 5 AMDMUOx Unfilled Orders for Durable Goods M 14385946 Unf orders: dble
12 68* 5 BUSINVx Total Business Inventories M 15192014 M&T invent
13 69* 2 ISRATIOx Total Business: Inventories to Sales Ratio M 15191529 M&T invent/sales
14 130* 2 UMCSENTx Consumer Sentiment Index hhsntn Consumer expect
Table C.6: Group 6: interest and exchange rates
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 84 2 FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate M 110155157 Fed Funds
2 85* 2 CP3Mx 3-Month AA Financial Commercial Paper Rate CPF3M Comm paper
3 86 2 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill M 110155165 3 mo T-bill
4 87 2 TB6MS 6-Month Treasury Bill M 110155166 6 mo T-bill
5 88 2 GS1 1-Year Treasury Rate M 110155168 1 yr T-bond
6 89 2 GS5 5-Year Treasury Rate M 110155174 5 yr T-bond
7 90 2 GS10 10-Year Treasury Rate M 110155169 10 yr T-bond
8 91 2 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield Aaa bond
9 92 2 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Baa bond
10 93* 1 COMPAPFFx 3-Month Commercial Paper Minus FEDFUNDS CP-FF spread
11 94 1 TB3SMFFM 3-Month Treasury C Minus FEDFUNDS 3 mo-FF spread
12 95 1 TB6SMFFM 6-Month Treasury C Minus FEDFUNDS 6 mo-FF spread
13 96 1 T1YFFM 1-Year Treasury C Minus FEDFUNDS 1 yr-FF spread
14 97 1 T5YFFM 5-Year Treasury C Minus FEDFUNDS 5 yr-FF spread
15 98 1 T10YFFM 10-Year Treasury C Minus FEDFUNDS 10 yr-FF spread
16 99 1 AAAFFM Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Minus FEDFUNDS Aaa-FF spread
17 100 1 BAAFFM Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond Minus FEDFUNDS Baa-FF spread
18 101 5 TWEXMMTH Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies Ex rate: avg
19 102* 5 EXSZUSx Switzerland/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate M 110154768 Ex rate: Switz
20 103* 5 EXJPUSx Japan/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate M 110154755 Ex rate: Japan
21 104* 5 EXUSUKx U.S./U.K. Foreign Exchange Rate M 110154772 Ex rate: UK
22 105* 5 EXCAUSx Canada/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate M 110154744 EX rate: Canada
Table C.7: Group 7: prices
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 106 6 PPIFGS PPI: Finished Goods M110157517 PPI: fin gds
2 107 6 PPIFCG PPI: Finished Consumer Goods M110157508 PPI: cons gds
3 108 6 PPIITM PPI: Intermediate Materials M 110157527 PPI: int matls
4 109 6 PPICRM PPI: Crude Materials M 110157500 PPI: crude matls
5 110* 6 OILPRICEx Crude Oil, spliced WTI and Cushing M 110157273 Spot market price
6 111 6 PPICMM PPI: Metals and metal products: M 110157335 PPI: nonferrous
7 112 1 NAPMPRI ISM Manufacturing: Prices Index M 110157204 NAPM com price
8 113 6 CPIAUCSL CPI: All Items M 110157323 CPI-U: all
9 114 6 CPIAPPSL CPI: Apparel M 110157299 CPI-U: apparel
10 115 6 CPITRNSL CPI: Transportation M 110157302 CPI-U: transp
11 116 6 CPIMEDSL CPI: Medical Care M 110157304 CPI-U: medical
12 117 6 CUSR0000SAC CPI: Commodities M 110157314 CPI-U: comm.
13 118 6 CUUR0000SAD CPI: Durables M 110157315 CPI-U: dbles
14 119 6 CUSR0000SAS CPI: Services M 110157325 CPI-U: services
15 120 6 CPIULFSL CPI: All Items Less Food M 110157328 CPI-U: ex food
16 121 6 CUUR0000SA0L2 CPI: All items less shelter M 110157329 CPI-U: ex shelter
17 122 6 CUSR0000SA0L5 CPI: All items less medical care M 110157330 CPI-U: ex med
18 123 6 PCEPI Personal Cons. Expend.: Chain Index gmdc PCE defl
19 124 6 DDURRG3M086SBEA Personal Cons. Exp: Durable goods gmdcd PCE defl: dlbes
20 125 6 DNDGRG3M086SBEA Personal Cons. Exp: Nondurable goods gmdcn PCE defl: nondble
21 126 6 DSERRG3M086SBEA Personal Cons. Exp: Services gmdcs PCE defl: service
Table C.8: Group 8: stock market
id tcode FRED Description GSI GSI: description
1 80* 5 S&P 500 S&P’s Common Stock Price Index: Composite M 110155044 S&P 500
2 81* 5 S&P: indust S&P’s Common Stock Price Index: Industrials M 110155047 S&P: indust
3 82* 2 S&P div yield S&P’s Composite Common Stock: Dividend Yield S&P div yield
4 83* 5 S&P PE ratio S&P’s Composite Common Stock: Price-Earnings Ratio S&P PE ratio
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C.2 Alternative factor analysis
We presents the results of the factor analysis performed on the whole sample available,
from 1959M01 to 2020M10 in Table C.9. The information criterion PCp2 selects eight
relevant factors, which collectively explain a fraction of 0.5055 of the panel variance.
Table C.9: Estimated factors and heavy loading series - R2(8) = 0.5055
mR2(1) 0.1725 mR2(2) 0.0745 mR2(3) 0.0680 mR2(4) 0.0537
ipmansics 0.8055 cusr0000sac 0.4023 aaaffm 0.3690 gs1 0.5058
payems 0.7989 cusr0000sa0l2 0.3871 t10yffm 0.3568 gs5 0.4989
ipfpnss 0.7579 dndgrg3m086sbea 0.3780 baaffm 0.3518 aaa 0.4772
indpro 0.7524 cpitrnsl 0.3733 dndgrg3m086sbea 0.3439 tb6ms 0.4594
cumfns 0.7409 cpiaucsl 0.3596 cusr0000sac 0.3437 gs10 0.4592
usgood 0.7375 pcepi 0.3499 cusr0000sa0l2 0.3252 baa 0.4238
ipfinal 0.6921 cusr0000sa0l5 0.3444 cpiaucsl 0.3220 cp3mx 0.3690
manemp 0.6886 cpiulfsl 0.3128 t5yffm 0.3156 tb3ms 0.3665
dmanemp 0.6437 wpsid61 0.2886 cusr0000sa0l5 0.3024 twexafegsmthx 0.1824
ipbuseq 0.6290 wpsfd49502 0.2816 pcepi 0.2868 houst 0.1819
mR2(5) 0.0480 mR2(6) 0.0339 mR2(7) 0.0298 mR2(8) 0.0252
t1yffm 0.5144 s&p pe ratio 0.3447 s&p 500 0.3206 twexafegsmthx 0.3828
tb6smffm 0.4914 s&p 500 0.2844 s&p: indust 0.3162 exszusx 0.1868
tb3smffm 0.4445 s&p: indust 0.2832 vxoclsx 0.2513 conspi 0.1825
t5yffm 0.4174 s&p div yield 0.2645 uemp15ov 0.2384 exusukx 0.1652
t10yffm 0.3497 awhman 0.2002 ces0600000007 0.2108 ces3000000008 0.1538
aaaffm 0.2689 ces0600000007 0.1950 awhman 0.2101 exjpusx 0.1293
compapffx 0.2589 uemp15ov 0.1460 s&p div yield 0.2091 ces0600000008 0.1070
baaffm 0.2015 umcsentx 0.1454 uemp27ov 0.1458 ustrade 0.0932
permit 0.1789 mzmsl 0.1397 s&p pe ratio 0.0942 acogno 0.0805
permitw 0.1567 m2sl 0.1084 uemp15t26 0.0883 ustpu 0.0795
Note: Note: Eight factors selected by the PCp2 criterion and the ten series loading the most on each
factor. The table also reports the total variation explained by the eight factors (R2(8)), the additional
variation explained by adding the kth factor (mR2(k)). As an example, the eight factors explain
together 50.55% of the panel variation, while mR2(1) = 0.1725 is the quota explained solely by the
first factor. Moreover, 0.8055 is the fraction of variation of the series ipmansics explained by the first
factor.
Factor interpretation is compatible with the results from the shorter sample. Fac-
tors 1 to 5 still carry information, respectively, on real production, prices, forward
looking variables, interest rate, and a mixture of forward looking and housing vari-
ables. Factors 6 and 7 have explanatory power for the stock market and the labour
market sectors, while the last factor concentrates on exchange rates. Figure C.1 shows
the cycle estimated on the longer sample contrasted with the index we used in our
analysis.
Figure C.1: Alternative economic cycle estimated on 8 factors












NBER recessions Longer sample cycle Economic cycle
Note: Contrasting the economic cycle used in the analysis with the cycle estimated using a sample up
to 2020M10. The selection criteria picks 8 significant factors.
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C.3 Additional figures for baseline specification
Our baseline specification includes (log real) government expenditure, tax revenues,
GDP, and it is augmented with an estimate of the cycle.
Figure C.2: Linear and generalised IRFs, GDP response






































































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax
revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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C.3.1 Scenario analysis
Figure C.3: Scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical scenarios








































































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock triggered in a median representative re-
cession or expansion. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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C.4 Additional figures for augmented specifications
We present additional figures for our two augmented specifications, one extending the
baseline with a measure of private credit, and the other with public debt. Both the
additional variables are normalized by GDP to carry information on financial stress
and fiscal space, rather than on the variables themselves.
Figure C.4: Linear and generalised IRFs, GDP response






































































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax
revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure C.5: Generalised IRFs, credit-to-GDP response








































Note: Generalised impulse responses. Percentage private credit response to percentages of fiscal shock.
STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit. Confidence bands are at
5th and 95th percentile.
Figure C.6: Linear and generalised IRFs, GDP response










































































Note: Cumulative linear (a, b) and generalised impulse responses. Percentage GDP response to a unit
standard deviation (a, b) or to percentages of fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax
revenues, public debt, and GDP. Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure C.7: Generalised IRFs, debt-to-GDP response












































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses. Percentage public debt response to percentages of
fiscal shock. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, and GDP. Confidence
bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
C.4.1 Scenario analysis
Figure C.8: Credit-augmented specification, scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical sce-
narios








































































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock triggered in a median representative re-
cession or expansion. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, and private credit.
Confidence bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
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Figure C.9: Debt-augmented specification, scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical scenar-
ios
































































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock triggered in a median representative reces-
sion or expansion. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, and GDP. Confidence
bands are at 5th and 95th percentile.
Figure C.10: Debt-augmented specification, scenario analysis, GIRFs for typical sce-
narios with a shock to public debt








































































































Note: Cumulative generalised impulse responses to a shock triggered in a median representative reces-
sion or expansion. The same shock is applied with opposite signs to government expenditure and public
debt. STVAR includes public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt, and GDP. Confidence bands are
at 5th and 95th percentile.
Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Theoretical model
The theoretical framework draws upon Chah et al. (1995) and José Luengo-Prado
(2006).










At = RtAt−1 + Yt − Ct − P dt dt
Dt = dt + (1− δ)Dt−1
At + ϕP
d
t Dt ≥ 0
A−1, D−1 given;
t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞.
where
Yt - labour income
At - assets at the end of period t
Ct - nondurable consumption
Dt - stock of durables at the end of period t
dt - purchases of durables
ρ - rate of time preference (β = (1 + ρ)−1 is the discount factor)
δ - rate of depreciation on durables (ψ = 1− δ is a depreciation factor)
ϕ - fraction of the durable stock that can be financed (θ = 1 − ϕ is the required
down payment)





− 1 is the relative price
inflation)
rt - real interest rate (Rt = 1 + rt is the compound real interest rate)
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Denote Uc(t) and Ud(t) the marginal utilities of nondurable and durable consump-
tion, respectively, in period t.
The first order conditions are










− ϕP dt µt (D.2)
with supplementary slackness conditions































is the user cost of durables. It depends positively on
the rate of depreciation δ and the interest rate r, and negatively on the inflation rate
in the relative price of durables πd.








We allow for time variation in γt to capture the possibility of shocks to preferences
for durables. In the special case of σ = 1, the utility function collapses to U(Ct, Dt) =
log(Ct) + γtlog(Dt). Using this functional form and replacing for the marginal utilities





















which gives the optimal ratio of durables to nondurables. If liquidity constraints








In this case, the optimal ratio of durables to nondurables depends positively on the
durable preferences γ and (via Ω) on the inflation rate in the relative price of durables
πd and is a negative function of relative prices P d and (via Ω) of the rate of depreciation
δ and the interest rate r.
Assume the following exogeneous processes for the relative price of durables P d
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where the asterisk (∗) denotes steady-state values.
Appendix D.2 shows results from a simulation under perfect foresight for the dy-
namic adjustment of Ct and Dt for a set of shocks to relative prices, preferences,
and the interest rate. The results cover both temporary and permanent shocks and
show adjustment paths for a consumer who becomes, or alternatively does not become,
liquidity-constrained as a result of the shock.
In particular, Figures D.1 and D.2 show the response to a decline and an increase,
respectively, in the relative price of durables P d with autoregressive coefficients, respec-
tively, ρp = 0.1 and ρp = 1.0 for the temporary and the permanent shock, respectively.
Similarly, Figures D.3, D.4, D.5 and D.6 show responses to increases and declines in
the preference for durables γ and the interest rate r with autoregressive coefficients for
the temporary shocks equal, in both cases, to ργ = 0.1 and ρR = 0.1.
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D.2 Dynamic responses to shocks in the theoretical model
Figure D.1: Temporary and permanent decline of 1% in relative durable prices P d









































D.2. DYNAMIC RESPONSES TO SHOCKS IN THE THEORETICAL MODEL101
Figure D.2: Temporary and permanent increase of 1% in relative durable prices P d
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Figure D.3: Temporary and permanent increase in the preference parameter γ for
durables
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Figure D.4: Temporary and permanent decline in the preference parameter γ for
durables
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Figure D.5: Temporary and permanent decline in the interest rate r
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Figure D.6: Temporary and permanent increase in the interest rate r
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D.3 Data description and sources
The empirical model is estimated on quarterly data available for 1996Q1-2018Q3 (in
levels) as of 30 January 2019. For the euro area member states we take the series for
nominal and real D and C from Eurostat, and we compute P d and P . We construct our
euro area series as a bottom-up aggregation of country-level data for the 19 individual
member states. The series for R are provided by National Central Banks and collected
in the MIR – MFI Interest Rate Statistics database managed by the European Central
Bank Statistical Data Warehouse. Monthly series of recession and expansion periods
for euro area countries are published by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI);
the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) publishes a quarterly series for the
euro area aggregate.
All the data on the US are taken from Haver Analytics. The original source for
nominal and real series for D and C and the corresponding deflators is the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. R is published by the Federal Reserve Board. Chronologies of
recessions and expansions are published by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER).
Measures on excess financial assets are computed based on data published by the
European Central Bank in the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)
for EA countries and the euro area aggregate. Analogous data for the US are published
by the Federal Reserve Board in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
D, C, P d, and P are in logs and the deflators are rebased. All series are differenced
accordingly, to obtain year-on-year percent changes.
(1) D - Individual consumption expenditure of durable goods in chain linked volume,
millions of euro, calendar and seasonally adjusted data.
(2) C - Individual consumption expenditure of semi-durable and nondurable goods
and services in chain linked volume, millions of euro, calendar and seasonally
adjusted data.
(3) P d - Implicit deflator for D, computed using D and the individual consumption
expenditure of durable goods in current prices.
(4) P - Implicit deflator for C, computed using D and the individual consumption
expenditure of semi-durable and nondurable goods and services in current prices.
(5) R - Composite lending rate to consumer credit in nominal terms.
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D.4 Real world example of a durable-specific supply shock
Figure D.7: Real world supply shock example










Total consumption Price of total consumption Household appliances Price of hosehould appliances Announcement
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Quantity and prices of total consumption and household appliance (belonging to durables)
consumption. On 22 January 2018, a hike on the tariffs of imported washing machines was announced,
leading to a sharp increase in their prices and a corresponding decline in quantities. In our framework,
this is a clear durable(subsector)-specific negative supply shock, with aggregate consumption and prices
not reacting.
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D.5 Optimal lag selection and parameter stability tests
D.5.1 Optimal lag selection
Table D.1: Optimal VAR order
US EA DE FR IT ES
L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4
Akaike 1 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 4 4
Schwarz Bayesian 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
Hannan-Quinn 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 3
Note: Optimal lag order of a VAR fitted on quarterly data in levels (L) and year-on-year (∆4) according
to different criteria. Maximum lag order is set to 4.
D.5.2 Parameter stability tests
Table D.2: Chow test - standard version
US EA DE FR IT ES
TB/T L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4
p 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
35%
λss
1% R R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
λbp
1% R R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
50%
λss
1% R R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
λbp
1% R R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
65%
λss
1% R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R
λbp
1% R R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
Note: Chow test for parameter stability of a VAR(p) where the lag order p is based on the Schwarz
Bayesian criterion. R stands for rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter stability at different
confidence levels (1%, 5%, 10%). Both the split sample and the breaking point version of the test, as
described in Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004), are performed on data in levels and in year-on-year growth
rates. The breaking point is assumed to be at 35%, 50%, and 65% of the sample, corresponding to
2003Q4, 2007Q2, 2010Q3 for the series in levels and 2004Q2, 2007Q4, and 2011Q1 for the ones in
year-on-year growth rates.
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Table D.3: Chow test - bootstrapped version
US EA DE FR IT ES
TB/T L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4
p 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
35%
λss
1% R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
λbp
1% R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
50%
λss
1% R R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R R R R R
λbp
1% R R R R R R R R R R R
5% R R R R R R R R R R R R




5% R R R R
10% R R R R
λbp
1% R R R
5% R R R R R R R R
10% R R R R R R R R
Note: Chow test for parameter stability of a VAR(p) where the lag order p is based on the Schwarz
Bayesian criterion. R stands for rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter stability at different
confidence levels (1%, 5%, 10%). Both the split sample and the breaking point version of the test, as
described in Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004), are performed on data in levels and in year-on-year growth
rates. To avoid small sample distortions, we follow Candelon and Lütkepohl (2001) and use a bootstrap
correction with 100, 000. The breaking point is assumed to be at 35%, 50%, and 65% of the sample,
corresponding to 2003Q4, 2007Q2, 2010Q3 for the series in levels and 2004Q2, 2007Q4, and 2011Q1
for the ones in year-on-year growth rates.
Table D.4: Nyblom-Hansen parameter stability test
US EA DE FR IT ES
L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4 L ∆4
BIC
p 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
Lc 2.18** 2.32** 2.59*** 2.96** 2.02** 1.85* 2.41*** 1.87* 2.23** 2.87*** 3.84* 3.75*
AIC
p 1 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 4 4
Lc 2.18** 3.89 4.76** 4.47* 3.13** 4.93** 4.57* 3.39 3.34 3.86*** 4.79** 4.54*
Note: Nyblom-Hansen test for parameter stability of a VAR(p), where the lag order p is based on
either the Schwarz Bayesian (BIC) or the Akaike (AIC) criterion. We report the statistic for joint
stability of all parameters (Lc). Stars indicate the confidence level for rejecting the null hypothesis of
parameter stability: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. Critical values are tabulated in Nyblom (1989) and Hansen
(1990, 1992).
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D.6 Priors and empirical model estimation
The model estimation relies on Bayesian methods: we perform 3, 000 iterations of the
Gibbs sampler and discard the first 1500. The objects of interest to be estimated are
β (Equation 4.8), Ω (Equation 4.11), Z−1 (Equation 4.13), H (Equation 4.15), and Φi
(Equation 4.16).
The prior distribution for β, Z−1, and H is assumed to be normal, while the priors
for Ω and Φi take the form of an inverse Gamma distribution. The parametrization
and the calibration of hyperparameters are as in Dieppe et al. (2016), who rely on Chan
and Jeliazkov (2009), and Legrand (2018). We set the autoregressive coefficient on the
residual variance γ in Equation 4.16 to 0.85.
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D.7 Additional tables and figures - Baseline specification
D.7.1 Impulse response functions computed using the long-run value
of Σt
Figure D.8: Euro area impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt.
Figure D.9: United States impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt.
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Figure D.10: Germany impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt.
Figure D.11: France impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt.
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Figure D.12: Italy impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt.
Figure D.13: Spain impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt.
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D.7.2 Impulse response functions computed with time-varying Σt, av-
eraged over pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.
Figure D.14: Euro area impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Average of the time-contingent impulse response functions for three different periods: 2003Q1-
2007Q4 (pre-crisis), 2008Q1-2012Q4 (crisis), and 2013Q1-2018Q3 (post-crisis recovery).
Figure D.15: United States impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Average of the time-contingent impulse response functions for three different periods: 2003Q1-
2007Q4 (pre-crisis), 2008Q1-2012Q4 (crisis), and 2013Q1-2018Q3 (post-crisis recovery).
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Figure D.16: Germany impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Average of the time-contingent impulse response functions for three different periods: 2003Q1-
2007Q4 (pre-crisis), 2008Q1-2012Q4 (crisis), and 2013Q1-2018Q3 (post-crisis recovery).
Figure D.17: France impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Average of the time-contingent impulse response functions for three different periods: 2003Q1-
2007Q4 (pre-crisis), 2008Q1-2012Q4 (crisis) and 2013Q1-2018Q3 (post-crisis recovery).
116 APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Figure D.18: Italy impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Average of the time-contingent impulse response functions for three different periods: 2003Q1-
2007Q4 (pre-crisis), 2008Q1-2012Q4 (crisis), and 2013Q1-2018Q3 (post-crisis recovery).
Figure D.19: Spain impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Average of the time-contingent impulse response functions for three different periods: 2003Q1-
2007Q4 (pre-crisis), 2008Q1-2012Q4 (crisis), and 2013Q1-2018Q3 (post-crisis recovery).
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D.7.3 Impulse response functions over time
Figure D.20: Euro area impulse response functions
Note: Impulse response functions for each quarter in the sample.
Figure D.21: United States impulse response functions
Note: Impulse response functions for each quarter in the sample.
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Figure D.22: Germany impulse response functions
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Note: Impulse response functions for each quarter in the sample.
Figure D.23: France impulse response functions
Note: Impulse response functions for each quarter in the sample.
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Figure D.24: Italy impulse response functions
Note: Impulse response functions for each quarter in the sample.
Figure D.25: Spain impulse response functions
Note: Impulse response functions for each quarter in the sample.
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D.7.4 Historical decomposition
Figure D.26: Euro area historical decomposition




























































Exogenous contribution Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
Note: Historical decomposition for year-on-year growth rate of the five endogenous variables and our
total consumption aggregate.
Figure D.27: United States historical decomposition



























































Exogenous contribution Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
Note: Historical decomposition for year-on-year growth rate of the five endogenous variables and our
total consumption aggregate.
D.7. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES - BASELINE SPECIFICATION 121
Figure D.28: Germany historical decomposition
























































Exogenous contribution Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
Note: Historical decomposition for year-on-year growth rate of the five endogenous variables and our
total consumption aggregate.
Figure D.29: France historical decomposition

























































Exogenous contribution Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
Note: Historical decomposition for year-on-year growth rate of the five endogenous variables and our
total consumption aggregate.
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Figure D.30: Italy historical decomposition





















































Exogenous contribution Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
Note: Historical decomposition for year-on-year growth rate of the five endogenous variables and our
total consumption aggregate.
Figure D.31: Spain historical decomposition






















































Exogenous contribution Durables demand Durables supply Aggregate demand Aggregate supply Monetary conditions Total
Note: Historical decomposition for year-on-year growth rate of the five endogenous variables and our
total consumption aggregate.
D.7. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES - BASELINE SPECIFICATION 123
D.7.5 Spillovers: distributions of maxima over time
Figure D.32: Cumulative distribution function of peak spillover for each quarter -
demand
Note: Kernel estimation of the cumulative distribution function of peak reaction of nondurable con-
sumption to a durable-specific demand shock, as identified in Section 4.4.2. Each grey line represents
the cumulative distribution for a given quarter, generated by 1, 500 extractions via Gibbs sampling.
The support is limited to the interval [−2, 2] to cut off outliers and the magnitude of the peak is rescaled
by the impact value of the shock for durables to make it comparable across time and countries. Vertical
line is on zero, horizontal lines indicate how much of the density function cumulates before (after) zero,
on the left (right) scale.
Figure D.33: Cumulative distribution function of peak spillover for each quarter -
supply
Note: Kernel estimation of the cumulative distribution function of peak reaction of nondurable con-
sumption to a durable-specific supply shock, as identified in Section 4.4.2. Each grey line represents the
cumulative distribution for a given quarter, generated by 1, 500 extractions via Gibbs sampling. The
support is limited to the interval [−2, 2] to cut off outliers and the magnitude of the peak is rescaled by
the impact value of the shock for durables to make it comparable across time and countries. Vertical
line is on zero, horizontal lines indicate how much of the density function cumulates before (after) zero,
on the left (right) scale.
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D.7.6 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Table D.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition and share of total variance explained
by the model
Shares of explained variance (sum equals 100) Total variance
Horizon\Shock εDD εDS εDD+DS εAD εAS εM explained
US
1 1.7 2.4 4.1 30.4 47.1 18.3 78.9
4 3.5 8.3 11.8 30.2 43.3 14.7 76.8
8 4.4 13.3 17.7 26.3 41.6 14.4 75.9
20 5.6 15.7 21.3 24.4 39.7 14.6 76.8
EA
1 1.5 2.8 4.3 28.8 41.5 25.4 78.0
4 2.4 4.4 6.8 16.0 51.5 25.8 80.5
8 4.1 6.4 10.5 18.3 49.7 21.5 82.7
20 5.7 8.3 14.0 20.9 43.4 21.7 83.3
DE
1 2.0 2.1 4.1 25.7 45.3 24.9 76.5
4 2.7 2.8 5.5 26.2 47.1 21.1 77.2
8 3.1 3.6 6.6 25.7 46.0 21.7 78.2
20 3.3 3.9 7.1 25.5 45.2 22.2 78.6
FR
1 1.0 1.7 2.7 21.7 41.4 34.2 76.6
4 2.6 4.4 7.0 14.9 42.6 35.5 77.6
8 5.0 5.9 10.8 18.2 41.5 29.4 78.4
20 5.9 7.0 12.9 20.5 37.4 29.2 79.5
IT
1 1.0 1.7 2.7 24.6 39.9 32.7 75.8
4 4.4 5.1 9.5 17.4 34.9 38.3 76.2
8 6.9 7.4 14.3 23.2 32.2 30.2 74.1
20 7.7 8.4 16.1 28.2 28.8 27.0 75.8
ES
1 1.3 1.8 3.0 35.0 27.8 34.2 77.7
4 6.3 5.8 12.1 24.2 22.3 41.4 79.9
8 8.8 12.3 21.1 22.7 21.2 35.0 79.1
20 9.2 15.5 24.6 25.0 20.3 30.0 80.0
Note: Average percentage of the explained variance of the error made in forecasting total consumption,




In this section we present results for some alternative specifications: a BVAR(p) with
constant parameters estimated both in levels and in year-on-year differences, where
the optimal lag order p is based on the Bayesian Schwarz information criterion as
reported in Appendix D.5.1, and a TVP-SVAR(1) as in the baseline, but replacing
the nondurable consumption variable with real GDP excluding durable consumption
expenditures.
D.8.1 BVAR(p): Specification in year-on-year changes, constant pa-
rameters
Figure D.34: Euro area impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(2), with 68% credibility bands.
Figure D.35: United States impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
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Figure D.36: Germany impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
Figure D.37: France impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
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Figure D.38: Italy impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
Figure D.39: Spain impulse response functions












































































































































Note:Impulse response functions from a BVAR(3), with 68% credibility bands.
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D.8.2 BVAR(p): Specification in levels, constant parameters
Figure D.40: Euro area impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
Figure D.41: United States impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
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Figure D.42: Germany impulse response functions
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Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
Figure D.43: France impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
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Figure D.44: Italy impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(1), with 68% credibility bands.
Figure D.45: Spain impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions from a BVAR(3), with 68% credibility bands.
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D.8.3 TVP-SVAR(1): Using GDP ex-durables, instead of nondurables
Figure D.46: Euro area impulse response functions







































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
Figure D.47: United States impulse response functions







































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
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Figure D.48: Germany impulse response functions







































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
Figure D.49: France impulse response functions







































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
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Figure D.50: Italy impulse response functions







































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
Figure D.51: Spain impulse response functions







































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
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D.8.4 TVP-SVAR(1): Using durables together with housing
Figure D.52: Euro area impulse response functions



























































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
Figure D.53: United States impulse response functions

































































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
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Figure D.54: Germany impulse response functions


























































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
Figure D.55: France impulse response functions





























































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
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Figure D.56: Italy impulse response functions































































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
Figure D.57: Spain impulse response functions












































































































































Note: Impulse response functions computed using the long-run, homoskedastic value of Σt, with 68%
credibility bands.
